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Introduction

1
Introduction

Mythology has played a consistent role in the history of Zionism from its inception as a
political movement in the late 19th century. Those present for Theodor Herzl’s speeches at the
first series of Zionist congresses described him in superhuman terms. Later leaders like Dr.
Chaim Weizmann worked to demythologize Herzl and build their own mythos to emphasize
their importance to the Zionist movement. Though Weizmann was undoubtedly a pivotal figure
from the war years leading up to the 1920s in securing the Balfour Declaration from the British
government, he and his followers sought to insulate his legacy from criticism or dilution.
Weizmann’s mythos obfuscated the nuances of Zionist history in the early 1900s. James
Renton outlined the basic elements of the Weizmann myth to illustrate its capacity for reducing
the history to a linear narrative and portray Weizmann as the protagonist in a hero’s journey:
At the beginning of the First World War, if not from Weizmann’s childhood, he realized
the destiny of the Zionist movement lay with Great Britain. Surrounded by a stagnant,
ineffectual leadership in both the global and British context, Weizmann intuitively
envisioned the critical importance of winning the support of this imperial power which he
predicted would occupy Palestine, achieve a decisive victory in the war as a whole and
dismember the Ottoman Empire. Armed with this prophetic vision and his genius for
statesmanship and leadership, Weizmann proceeded to persuade the British Government
and the Establishment during the years 1914-1917 to support the aims of the Zionist
movement, which led to the publication of the Balfour Declaration. Single-handedly he
changed the future of the nation and brought it to the crest of what was constructed as the
beginning of its redemption and birth.1
Weizmann and his allies consciously perpetuated this narrative, especially after he assumed
leadership of the movement in 1920. Following his death in 1952, his followers preserved his
legacy amidst changing historical realities such as Israel’s new statehood.
One such Weizmann supporter was Louis Lipsky, who served as Chairman of the Zionist
Organization of America (ZOA) from 1922 to 1930. In 1956, he published A Gallery of Zionist

1

James Renton, “Reconsidering Weizmann and Gaster” in Nationalism, Zionism and Ethnic Mobilization of the
Jews in 1900 and Beyond, ed. Michael Berkowitz (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 131.
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Profiles. He explained his purpose thusly: “I had hoped to recapture within the form of a Profile
the lingering memories of a long life in which I walked in their company.”2 The timeframe
Lipsky chose to explore follows the growth of the movement’s creation in the late 1800s into the
1930s. Though he conceded many omissions, Lipsky made some striking inclusions with the
profiles he included in his gallery. He added entries for major Zionist luminaries like Theodor
Herzl, the founder of the political organization, and Louis Brandeis, the principal American
leader during the First World War, but also chose to include notable American “non-Zionist”
Cyrus Adler.
Lipsky’s selections to his Zionist pantheon are notable, as his “In Europe” section
includes no native-born British Zionists. The only British Zionist of this description in the book
was Jacob de Haas, whom Lipsky placed in his “In America” section. Lipsky explained his
choice, writing, “Jacob de Haas was sent to the United States by Theodor Herzl on a Zionist
mission, became an American citizen and lived ever after as an American.”3 It is remarkable that
despite Great Britain’s close political proximity to the Zionist movement, Lipsky did not deem it
appropriate to name any native British Zionists. The implication is that Great Britain did not
contribute any Zionists who played a sufficiently significant role in Lipsky’s view.
Lipsky’s evaluation of British Zionists is part and parcel of the Weizmann myth. While
the mythology negatively affected political opponents like Louis Brandeis, whom Lipsky
roundly criticizes, it was most detrimental toward British Zionists. Weizmann himself ascribed
negative character traits and small roles in the movement to those who disagreed with him,
leading two principal British Zionists, Moses Gaster and Leopold Greenberg, to become

2
3

Louis Lipsky, A Gallery of Zionist Profiles (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956), xvii.
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sidelined in the narrative. Lipsky likely implicitly adopted Weizmann’s assessments when he
chose whom to include.
Deconstructing the Weizmann myth will shed light on the nuanced roles of Gaster,
Greenberg, and other British Zionists such as Leonard Stein, Colonel Frederick Kisch, and Sir
Alfred Mond. Stein, Kisch, and Mond never ran afoul of Weizmann politically like Gaster and
Greenberg. In fact, Stein, Kisch, and Mond took on significant responsibilities within the Zionist
Organization during the 1920s. For Gaster and Greenberg, their disagreements and poor relations
with Weizmann directly contributed to their marginalization in the movement. Stein, Kisch, and
Mond played subordinate roles that allowed the makers of the Weizmann myth to claim the
lion’s share of the credit for accomplishments on which they collaborated with Weizmann.
By most accounts, Moses Gaster was the foremost British Zionist as late as 1913. The
Manchester Guardian correspondent at the eleventh Zionist Congress in Vienna of that year
reported, “Among the delegates from this country at the Congress the most noteworthy figure
will be Dr. Moses Gaster, Haham* of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews in England, and a wellknown Oriental scholar.”4 In 1905, Weizmann confided in Gaster, writing, “I never had any
doubt about your being the only man to whom I might turn to in frankness and friendship… I
admire the man as much as the Jew in you.”5 Despite the ample evidence testifying to Gaster’s
importance to the movement at large and in Britain especially, he found himself on the outside of
Weizmann’s confidence and the annals of the movement by 1916 and 1917.

*

A spiritual leader among Sephardic Jews, especially known for knowledge of the Law.
“The Zionist Congress at Vienna: Persons and Policies,” Our Correspondent, The Manchester Guardian (19011959), August 29, 1913, 8.
5
Weizmann to Gaster, Manchester, June 25, 1905, in The Essential Chaim Weizmann, ed. Barnet Litvinoff (New
York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 161.
4

Introduction

4

Leopold Greenberg was a journalist by trade and played a prominent role in the Uganda
plan of the early 20th century. Theodor Herzl had founded the World Zionist Organization
(WZO) on the program of garnering international support and legal framework for the
establishment of a Jewish state, in Palestine or elsewhere. Stuart Cohen noted, “As early as 1898,
Herzl had himself referred to England as ‘the Archimedan point where the lever could be
applied,’” meaning Herzl believed it was the British government that would take the lead in
endorsing the Jewish State.6 This program had support among British Zionists, including
Greenberg. He arranged Herzl’s meetings with Joseph Chamberlain, the secretary for the
colonies, and acted as Herzl’s ambassador in London.7 Though the Uganda plan fell through, due
in no small part to Weizmann’s intervention, Greenberg remained a supporter to the movement,
acquiring the Jewish Chronicle in 1907. Until his death in 1931, he turned the newspaper into a
leading resource for Anglo-Jewry and a major mouthpiece for Greenberg’s own brand of
Zionism.
Scholarly narratives surrounding Chaim Weizmann’s role in the Zionist Movement have
tended to focus on his undeniable rise to prominence in the first two decades of the 20th century
from little known Congress attendee from Russia to leader of the movement. Oftentimes these
narratives devolve into what Renton has convincingly labelled “The Weizmann Myth.” This
myth began in Weizmann’s own lifetime, aided through the publication of his autobiography,
Trial and Error in 1949. However, historians studying Zionism in the 1980s believed
Weizmann’s reputation needed repair. Norman Rose, author of Chaim Weizmann: A Biography
(1986), referred to Weizmann as a “political dodo” among figures like Theodor Herzl and the

6

Stuart Cohen, English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895-1920 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982), 80.
7
Cohen, English Zionists, 81.
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later David Ben Gurion, assessing Weizmann’s period to fit uncomfortably within the grand
scope of Zionist history.8 Rose, along with Jehuda Reinharz, who penned a two-volume
biography of Weizmann, Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader (1985) and Chaim
Weizmann: The Making of a Statesmen (1993), were instrumental in bringing Weizmann back
into the discourse. More recently, Michael Berkowitz and James Renton have challenged
Weizmann’s mythical status in Western Jewry and the Zionist Project: 1914-1933 (1997) and
Nationalism, Zionism and Ethnic Mobilization of Jews in 1900 and Beyond (2003).
Because the Weizmann myth serves to minimize the personal contributions of individuals
like Gaster, Greenberg, Stein, Kisch, and Mond, along with other British Zionists, this paper will
serve a multifold purpose. It will deconstruct the myth of Weizmann’s rise to prominence
between 1905, when he relocated to Manchester, and 1919 when the Balfour Declaration became
part of the peace negotiations; clear a space for the individual efforts and accomplishments of the
three individual examples to stand; and illustrate how British Zionists were instrumental to
Zionist aims during the period between 1905 and 1931. The aim is not to create a new myth
within Zionist history to replace the old, but to rebut the assertions about the qualities of British
Zionists and to put forth the argument that Gaster, Greenberg, Stein, Kisch, and Mond would all
be worthy additions to Lipsky’s gallery.
The first chapter will explore the world in which Weizmann inserted himself in 1905,
where Zionism faced staunch opposition from the Anglo-Jewish establishment and lacked the
sway over the working classes that it held in eastern Europe. It was in this environment that
Gaster and Greenberg were established forces, while Weizmann remained an outsider. This
chapter will demonstrate the important roles the two played in facilitating the discussions that

8
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would lead to the Balfour Declaration, while also showing how the infrastructure of Jewish
communal life in Britain enabled Weizmann to intertwine himself with the community as well as
he did.
The second chapter will focus on the main tasks of the Zionist Organization in the 1920s,
as well as the new challenges the movement faced. These included raising money for activity in
Palestine through the Keren Hayesod, promoting Zionism to Jews and non-Jews abroad, and
ameliorating Arab concerns with the increased Jewish presence. To aid in these efforts,
Weizmann entrusted Greenberg, Stein, Mond, and Kisch. Stein, Mond, and Kisch joined the
Zionist movement in the 1920s, and will be introduced in the chapter. Greenberg and Stein each
assisted in promoting Zionist activity through the Jewish Chronicle and a series of publications,
respectively. Weizmann chose Mond to serve as the president of the Keren Hayesod, and Mond
went on to serve in other positions within the Zionist organization during the decade. Kisch came
to Palestine to work for the organization as well, specializing in representing the Zionist position
to the Arabs as the two groups strove to find common ground. While the 1920s ended poorly for
the Zionist organization, the efforts of these four should not go unrecognized, given how the
organization was able to carry out its main goals for the most part for nearly the entire decade.
The third chapter will examine the series of conflicts between the WZO and the British
Mandate Government between 1919 and 1931. As numerous Arab revolts challenged the
infrastructure in Palestine, the British grew increasingly restrictive toward Zionist development
projects and immigration, creating tension between the constituents and their government. Over a
series of Cabinet White Papers, Zionists saw the government recede further from their
commitment to the Zionist project established in the Balfour Declaration. Upon each regression,
British Zionists in Britain played a major role in civic agitation, while Greenberg’s Chronicle
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drummed up support for Zionism, criticizing the government’s policies. Stein too was
significant, as he used his platform to publish a series of texts during the decade designed to
convince the British reading public of the value of Zionism to Britain.
Weizmann’s autobiography Trial and Error, Barrett Litvinoff’s The Essential Chaim
Weizmann, and the compiled Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann determine Weizmann’s
self-evaluation and his assessment of his contemporaries. They all perpetuate elements of the
Weizmann myth noted above, documenting the character flaws of Gaster and Greenberg that put
them at odds with Weizmann. Stein’s The Balfour Declaration, along with Lipsky’s A Gallery of
Zionist Profiles, offer glimpses in how the Weizmann myth proliferated among his supporters,
though both are more charitable towards Weizmann’s opponents than the man himself. Stein’s
The Truth about Palestine, Awakening Palestine, and “The Jews in Palestine” best demonstrate
his personal contributions to the movement, along with Greenberg’s numerous editorials from
the Jewish Chronicle. Kisch’s Palestine Diary documents his activities in Palestine during the
1920s. Lastly, Nahum Sokolow, Weizmann’s close colleague during the late 1910s, penned
History of Zionism, providing an interesting counterpoint to the bedrock themes of the
Weizmann myth Renton enumerated above.
This introduction will conclude with a brief discussion of terms and definitions, namely
those pertaining to identity. This paper is chiefly concerned with British Zionists, and it is
necessary to denote who is included within this label. Regarding nationality, this paper will
utilize Lipsky’s considerations when discussing Jacob de Haas: one who adopts a new
nationality and embraces that identity has assumed that national identity. Moses Gaster was born
in Bucharest, Romania in 1856 but relocated to England after being expelled in 1885. He became
a British citizen in 1893, and thus became a British Zionist for this paper’s purposes. In contrast,
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Weizmann received honorary British citizenship in 1910, but never renounced his connection to
Russian Jewish life—he cannot be considered a British Zionist on par with the three examples
for this project.
The Zionist label is notoriously nebulous. Prior to the Mandate Period, distinctions
between “political” Zionists, those who supported Herzl’s program of official sanction for
Jewish statehood, “practical” Zionists, those who wanted to see the movement dedicate itself to
building infrastructure in Palestine without any concept of statehood or sanction, and “cultural”
Zionists, those who saw Zionism as a Jewish cultural renaissance movement centered in
Palestine, dominated the discourse of the early congresses. This paper will treat these viewpoints
as equally Zionist; most Zionists during the period exhibited elements of each of the three
polarities.
One can support the Zionist movement as an outsider, and even as a non-Jew. Berkowitz
included Arthur Balfour as a member within the new Zionist pantheon, writing, “In the store of
Zionist icons, his was probably the most recognized non-Jewish countenance in the interwar
years.”9 Balfour and his contemporary Zionist sympathizers such as David Lloyd George and Sir
Mark Sykes will not be considered British Zionists for this study, given their position outside the
movement and Jewish society. Sir Herbert Samuel presents an interesting case, as he was a firm
believer in Zionism, a cultural Jew, and a member of British government. However, Samuel
explained when speaking about his appointment as High Commissioner of Palestine, “I was there
to administer the country, not for the benefit of one section of the population only, but for all; not

9
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considered among his peers like Lloyd George or Balfour rather than Greenberg or Stein.
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British Zionists and the Balfour Declaration: 1905-1917
Historiography on British Zionists prior to 1920 tended to incorporate elements of the
Weizmann myth. Stuart Cohen’s 1982 English Zionists and British Jews notwithstanding,
articles from Eugene Black (2003) and David Cesarani (1992) portrayed English Zionists as
ineffectual, temperamental, and prone to infighting. While James Renton’s 2003 essay in
Nationalism, Zionism and Ethnic Mobilization of Jews in 1900 and Beyond, “Reconsidering
Chaim Weizmann and Moses Gaster in the Founding-Mythology of Zionism” goes far to salvage
one historical reputation harmed in the Weizmann myth, Gaster was not the only one
marginalized. During the period leading up to the Balfour Declaration, he and other known
British Zionists like Leopold Greenberg were significant in developing inroads with the Jewish
community in Britain for Zionism and paving the way for Weizmann’s eventually successful
diplomacy. Renton’s essential argument for reassessing Gaster’s reputation is thus transferrable
to these other actors who have historically been overlooked in most literature of the period.
Introduction
Zionism emerged in the late 19th century as one of many ideological responses to a period
of significant uncertainty for European Jewry amid increased anti-Semitism and cultural
assimilation occurring at varying levels across the continent. Zionism was a blanket term that
referred to the diverse theoretical solutions to rejuvenate Jewry in the Diaspora.1 Among these
many solutions was the political organization Theodor Herzl conceived in 1897 at the first
Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland. Nahum Sokolow, another high-ranking Zionist and
contemporary of Chaim Weizmann stated of Herzl, “He found the word which crystallized all
the yearnings and hopes of centuries.… He brought freedom to the Jewish soul and kindled

1

Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, introduction to “Zionism” in Jew in the Modern World, eds. Paul
Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 529.
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Jewish enthusiasm to a flame.”2 It was through Herzl’s organization that Zionist aims would
ultimately be realized in early decades of the 20th century.
Herzl was an assimilated Austrian from the upper echelon of European cosmopolitan
society, largely disconnected from the Jewish cultural milieu. Herzl’s Zionism did not at first
hinge on a Jewish state in Palestine—the proposed state could be located anywhere in the world
so long as the Jews were sovereign and free from anti-Semitism. He articulated this principle
clearly in his landmark 1896 The Jewish State. Other Zionists, particularly those steeped deeply
in Jewish tradition, were unwilling to accept any proposal short of Palestine. Sokolow noted of
Herzl:
He thought at first that it was immaterial where the proposed Jewish centre was situated.
He had no opportunity of knowing the real feeling of the Jewish people on this point.
When he tested that feeling he quickly discovered that Palestine was the only possible
country.3
While Herzl revised his opinion in his 1902 The New Old Land to advocate for a Jewish center in
Palestine, the question of where to locate the Jewish national home would shape Theodor Herzl’s
presidency of the Zionist Organization and influence younger Zionists such as Chaim
Weizmann.
Herzl and about 200 delegates from across the world developed the Basle Program at the
Basle Congress in 1897; it would go on to guide Zionist activities for the next decade. Sokolow
explained, “The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by
public law,” illustrating the central feature of political Zionism.4 As president of the World
Zionist Organization, Herzl explored official channels for recognition of a Jewish home in

2

Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism: 1600-1918, vol. 1 (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1969), first
published 1919, 263.
3
Sokolow, History vol. 1, 265.
4
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Palestine. This naturally drew him into failed negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, which
controlled Palestine during the period, and later with the British.
Weizmann was a little-known Zionist congress attendee from Russia during this early
phase of the Zionist Organization. He was quite different from Herzl in background. Louis
Lipsky, a later ally of Weizmann in the United States noted, “Unlike Herzl, he did not have to
return to his people from alien ways of life. He was born in the heart of the Galut*.”5 Weizmann
and his Russian contemporaries shared Herzl’s ultimate goals, but resented his approach.
Weizmann noted:
On me the formalism of the Zionist Congresses made a painful impression, especially
after one of my periodic visits to the wretched and oppressed Russian Jewish masses.
Actually, it was all very modest, but to us it smacked of artificiality, extravagance…
Herzl’s pursuit of great men, of princes and rulers, who were to ‘give’ us Palestine, was
the pursuit of a mirage.6
To Weizmann, Herzl’s persona, his approach, and by extension much of the Zionist
Organization, was emblematic of Western European Zionism that did not adequately address or
comprehend the plight of the struggling Eastern European Jews. This conflict between east and
west, between Palestine or compromise, would crystalize in the Uganda plan, a failed British
effort to give the Zionists territory in East Africa.
Given Herzl’s interest in courting centers of power, Great Britain was a natural avenue
for him to explore. In one of his letters, he observed:
From the first moment I entered the movement my eyes were directed towards England,
because I saw that by reason of the general situation there, that it was the Archimedean
point where the lever could be applied.7

*

From the Jewish Virtual Library: “The Hebrew term galut expresses the Jewish conception of the condition and
feelings of a nation uprooted from its homeland and subject to alien rule.”
5
Louis Lipsky, A Gallery of Zionist Profiles (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956), 50.
6
Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1949), 52.
7
Herzl to the Chairman of the English Zionist Congress, Vienna Feb. 28, 1898, Sokolow, History vol. 1, 295.
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Britain was the European power with the greatest influence in the Middle East, and while Herzl’s
words proved prophetic in the long term, the results in the short term were far more mixed. Herzl
found a ready supporter in the person of Moses Gaster, who wrote one of the few telegrams
Herzl read to the delegates at the Basle Congress.8 Zionism among English Jews faced a
challenging uphill battle, as institutions within the community worked to prevent Gaster from
promoting Zionism from the pulpit.9 Indeed, the Jewish religious establishment in Britain* and in
other European countries tended to view Zionism as a rejection of the Divine promise of a
messiah who would return the Jews to the promised land.10 Gaster and his contemporaries like
Herbert Bentwich, Leopold Greenberg, Joseph Cowen, and Israel Zangwill were dissidents
within the wider Anglo-Jewish community. Cohen noted, “Perennially critical of established
authority, they constituted a small but tenacious band of collaborators whose relish for the
communal fray helped to sustain much of their nationalist fervor.”11 It was these men who gave
Herzl the first chance at a Jewish national home and who laid the foundation for the institutions
upon which Weizmann relied during the first World War.
Leopold Greenberg provided the push for what Herzl had been seeking since Basle: the
opportunity for official recognition of Jewish sovereign territory from a great power. Greenberg
knew Joseph Chamberlain, secretary of state for the colonies, personally and conducted
negotiations as Herzl’s ambassador in London.12 He also put Herzl into contact with the Marquis

8

Sokolow, History vol. 1, 272.
Stuart Cohen, English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895-1920 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982), 48.
*
According to Cohen, the Jewish religious establishment was fractured on its response to Zionism. Herzl found
initial success with the leaders of Orthodox Judaism (186), but other Orthodox rabbis argued that Zionism was a
secular perversion of the Jewish religion (207). The Reform establishment was more uniform in its rejection of
political Zionism in the religious sphere (166).
10
Rabbi Zadok Hacohen Rabinowitz, “The Zionists Are Not Our Saviors,” c. 1900, Jew in the Modern World, eds.
Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 544.
11
Cohen, English Zionists, 69.
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Cohen, English Zionists, 81.
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of Lansdowne, the Foreign Minister at the time.13 In 1902, the British Colonial Office offered the
Zionists territory in East Africa as their proposed national home. The importance of the moment
could not be overstated, as Cohen observed:
The East Africa offer was something entirely different; for the first time, the government
of one country proposed to enter into a formal and territorial relationship with a
movement representing Jews of several others, without apparent regard for either
immediate financial profit or short-term civic return.14
On the cusp of securing his goal, Herzl also needed to win support from his own Zionist
constituency for the move.
British Zionists like Greenberg, Gaster, and especially Israel Zangwill took the early
Herzelian position that the Jewish national home need not specifically be located in Palestine.
They too certainly fit Weizmann’s category of Western European Zionists who did not
understand the cultural longing for Palestine so deeply felt among Eastern European Jews.
Zangwill eventually broke from the Zionist movement to form the Jewish Territorial
Organization, cementing his reputation as a territorialist, a Zionist willing to accept any land
offered.15 Given Weizmann and the Russians’ dislike for Herzl’s approach prior to the East
Africa proposal, the distinction between East and West would become clear.
The East Africa proposal, also called the Uganda plan, was essentially dead on arrival.
Weizmann observed, “The Jews of Russia were incapable of transferring their dreams and
longings from the land of their forefathers to any to any other territory.… The fact that the heart
of Jewry was fixed… on Palestine seemed beyond the understanding of the Westerners.”16
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Indeed, Weizmann made his dissatisfaction for the Uganda plan known at a speech he gave in
Geneva in 1903. He noted:
Zionist propagandists, and more so Ugandists of Zionists origin, sing unrestrained praises
to the enormous successes and the tremendous perspectives now opened for Jewish
people.… They spoke in the persons of Zangwill and Greenberg to the great masses of
the people in London, and they worked up the enthusiasm of these masses, who are
possessors of a hungry imagination.… Now, however, even the leaders have had to calm
the excessive fervor of Mr. Greenberg; the scheme has become the theme of debate for
the whole Jewry, while these gentlemen still profess not to know what is really concrete
in the scheme itself.17
Despite this rebuke, the Zionists moved to formally thank the British for the offer and send a
team to explore the territory. Sokolow noted, “Even this tentative acceptance of the scheme in
principle was bitterly opposed by a large selection of the delegates, especially those from
Russia†.”18 In any case, the team reported its findings in 1905, with Uganda proving unfavorable
for settlement
This early period highlighted trends that persisted throughout the next fifteen years of
Zionist history. Herzl was correct that Britain was the likely catalyst for any kind of official
recognition, and its leaders consistently expressed openness to Zionism absent in other official
European circles*. Disputes between the Eastern and Western factions within the Zionist
Organization continued to hamper the movement after Herzl’s death. The legacy of the failed
Uganda plan was such that it made Weizmann a ready enemy for the devout Herzl disciples like
Greenberg who had championed the move. Nonetheless, Weizmann relied on men like

17

“The Wrong Road to Zion,” in The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: Volume I; Series B: August 18981931, ed. Barnet Litvinoff (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), 60.
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Russian Jews tended to be poorer than their Western counterparts, more socially isolated, and as a consequence of
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Greenberg and Gaster in the coming decades to achieve the Balfour Declaration: a statement of
official recognition Herzl longed for.
WZO Post-Herzl: 1905-1911
Zionism faced a crisis of identity and goals after Herzl’s death in 1904 and the failure of
the Uganda plan. In Sokolow’s words, “there developed a somewhat serious fissure between the
two tendencies in the movement, the one looking to political activity and the other to Palestinian
colonization as the right line of progress,” a continued conflict between political and practical
Zionism.19 The man tasked with leading the Zionists through this troubling time was Lithuanian
businessman David Wolffsohn. According to Lipsky, Wolffsohn encouraged Herzl’s longtime
friend and confidant in the movement, Hungarian-born Max Nordau, to accept the leadership,
and only acquiesced after he realized Nordau would never accept.20
Although Wolffsohn and Nordau were the most apparent options, Moses Gaster too was
another established leader potentially in position to serve as Herzl’s successor. Historian Michael
Berkowitz has worked recently to examine the missing historical pieces of this pivotal figure in
the movement who has often been left behind in the retelling. Berkowitz suggested that two
factors prevented Gaster from advocating his role as successor: his limited access to capital and
his position as a rabbi.21 Herzl had used his substantial private wealth to finance Zionist
endeavors, and Wolffsohn, a timber merchant, had a more lucrative position than Gaster.
Gaster’s Zionist leanings had already proved a challenge among the religious community in
Britain. Berkowitz noted, “One of the few things almost everyone in the movement could agree
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on is that [sic] would not be right for the supreme leader to be a rabbi.… As much as Herzl
wished to encompass all of Jewry in his effort, Zionism was not to be a religious movement per
se.”22 Despite all this, Berkowitz asserted that “ [Gaster] never really made peace with himself
for not taking over from Herzl, because he felt that he was the best man for the job—however
much circumstances dictated that this was not to be.”23 The official Zionist history of the early
20th century misses how close Gaster was positioned to have become Herzl’s successor given his
towering position in the movement, had circumstances enabled him to do so.
Wolffsohn, never comfortable as Herzl’s successor, faced an unenviable position to say
the least. He inherited Russian enmity for Herzl’s old program without the hard-won respect
Herzl had achieved through his work for the movement. While Herzl had never successfully
unified Eastern and Western Zionism, such a possibility became impossible under Wolffsohn,
given the enmity he inspired. Lipsky explained:
The Leader [Herzl] had fallen on the battlefield and his partisans had retreated in
disorder. A new procedure, a new orientation or a new inspiration was called for. The
Russian Zionists pressed forward to take ‘power’ and Herzl’s disciples were being
overwhelmed by the life forces of the Movement which had its sources in Russia and
among the Yiddish-speaking Jews. The heritage of Herzl was slowly being retired to the
pages of history and new forces were coming forward to fill the vacuum.24
Thus, Wolffsohn began to deviate from the old Herzelian political program. He transferred the
headquarters of the Zionist movement to Cologne, and brought Dr. Otto Warburg of Germany
and Jacobus Kann of the Netherlands into his inner circle to work towards colonization in
Palestine.25 They did so without international approval, pivoting from Herzl’s approach to
building the Jewish state. It was also under Wolffsohn’s presidency that the Zionist Organization
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became increasingly institutionalized. He supported organizations like Die Welt, Herzl’s Zionist
newspaper, created new offices like a branch of the Jewish Colonial Trust in Constantinople, and
regularly travelled outside of Cologne to visit Jewish communities abroad.26 In spite of this, he
could not win the adoration Herzl had achieved.
Wolffsohn faced consistent pressure from the Russian faction, who did not support his
leadership. An illustrative example of this enmity came in 1906, when Weizmann travelled to
Cologne to meet with Wolffsohn as part of the Actions committee. Weizmann noted, “We—that
is, the younger group of the Democratic Faction—were trying to unseat Wolffsohn, whom we
considered unfit for the Presidency.”27 At the Eighth Zionist Congress, held at The Hague in
1907, Weizmann gave a speech decrying any kind of sole focus on political Zionism, even going
so far as to invoke Greenberg’s name when he said, “Mr. Greenberg once compared Zionist
work to digging a tunnel. It has to be tackled form both ends until the men meet in the middle.…
I should like to see the digging begin for once — that would be the synthesis I have desired.”28 In
Trial and Error, Weizmann noted that he believed it was this speech that finally affected the
Zionist Executive and displaced Wolffsohn from the presidency.29 Wolffsohn returned to the
presidency at the Ninth Zionist Congress in 1909 in Hamburg. His relationship with Weizmann
worsened as Weizmann’s attacks on his administration grew more virulent at the start of the
decade. Speaking to the Young Men’s Zionist Association in Manchester on 25 April 1910,
Weizmann decried political Zionism, Herzl’s legacy, as “mere empty phrases.”30 Of Wolffsohn,
he noted, “Mr. Wolffsohn has come here to England, but instead of giving us a programme of
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practical work, he is making attacks on his opponents.31 In private, Weizmann was less merciful,
writing to his wife in 1911 about a joke he told about Wolffsohn contracting syphilis.32
Wolffsohn’s presidency then was demonstratively a period of factionism and infighting for the
Zionist organization coupled with the challenges of furthering the movement’s ultimate purpose.
The organization required a leader who could establish a compromise between Eastern Zionism,
epitomized in the Russian Zionists, and Western Zionism, found in Germany and Britain.
Zionism in England
British Zionism faced challenges from the start from the entrenched Anglo-Jewish
community. In the early 1900s, the relatively small community of Anglo-Jewry was composed of
wealthy assimilated Jews defending their position in British society amid rising anti-Semitism,
and newly arrived eastern European immigrants concerned with building their new lives in
Britain.33 British Jews often became Zionists not because their positions in Britain were
oppressive in the manner of their Russian counterparts, but instead out a strong sense of ethnonationalism, similar to those of other people groups in the period without a nation-state of their
own. Sokolow noted, “The official Jewish community, with its rather parochial view, long
looked askance at Zionism, and until quite recent years those who followed Herzl have been a
minority struggling hard against a vast amount of prejudice and indifference.”34 Zionists like
Gaster and Leopold Greenberg faced an uphill battle at the local level, and challenges at the
international level resulting from the failure of the Uganda plan. However, Sokolow observed,
“This project [Uganda]… made Zionism not only a living factor in Judaism from an international
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standpoint, but also a political factor that was given consideration by one great Government,
namely, that of England.”35 Zionism in England had touched a chord with a handful of influential
policy makers such as Joseph Chamberlain, all due to British Zionist efforts to further the
Uganda plan.
In the early 20th century, British Zionists struggled to attain a position among the
representative Jewish bodies. Weizmann explained this hierarchy: “At that time there existed in
England what was known as the ‘Conjoint Committee,’ composed of representatives of the
Anglo-Jewish Association and the Board of Deputies.”36 Neither was particularly amenable to
Zionism. The highest-ranking Zionist in this organization was Claude Montefiore, whom
Weizmann described as a “high-minded man who considered nationalism beneath the religious
level of Jews.”37 A pivotal moment for Zionists in their campaign against the establishment came
in 1903 with the news of the Kishinev pogroms in Russia. Jewish organizations across the world
protested the violent attacks against Jews, and the Board of Deputies, headed by assimilationist
David Alexander, was no different. The Jewish Chronicle reported on 29 May 1903 notable
Zionist Herbert Bentwich’s objections to what he perceived to be too small an action from
Alexander. The story recounted:
It was not sufficient to relieve their coreligionists from the risks that still hung over them.
They were not justified in letting the matter rest there. Money alone was not sufficient,
but action, united action if possible, directed to restrain violent mobs and the pressure of
public opinion on those who could control them if they had that desire.38
Greenberg objected as well, as the Chronicle recorded on 19 June 1903. Greenberg pressed for a
resolution calling for the Tsar to denounce the atrocities, to be transmitted via the Russian
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Ambassador in Great Britain.39 Both of these measures failed, and the Zionists responded with
demonstrations against the perceived limited action from the Anglo-Jewish non-Zionist
establishment. Cohen saw this step as pivotal for Zionism in England, noting, “In so doing, they
had an effect on both the direction of Zionist work in England and on the tone and form of
debate throughout the community. Henceforth, the Zionist movement… was to be inextricably
linked to the entire spectrum of Anglo-Jewish life.”40 Though still a small minority among
Anglo-Jewry, Zionists like Gaster, Bentwich, and Greenberg were making important strides to
strengthen Zionism’s position within the community before Weizmann relocated from the
European continent.
Leopold Greenberg’s service to Zionism could not merely be summarized in his
involvement with the Uganda plan. In late 1906, he initiated a plan to acquire the Jewish
Chronicle, one of the preeminent newspapers among Anglo-Jewry. At this point, Greenberg was
the owner of an advertising agency, publisher of the Jewish Year Book, and a member of the
prestigious Zionist Inner Actions Committee of the WZO.41 Greenberg hastened to achieve this
objective because the ITO, Israel Zangwill’s splinter territorialist organization, was reportedly
also interested in purchasing the paper.42 Ultimately, the Jewish Chronicle scheme became part
and parcel of the larger ideological conflict within the Zionist movement during the period.
Greenberg, Joseph Cowen, and Wolffsohn supported the purchase but the plan came under harsh
criticism from Sokolow, then another member of the Inner Action Committee and a member of
the Russian Zionist faction, who saw it as a frivolous use of funds. 43 Despite the political
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underpinnings of the acquisition, Greenberg used the paper to express his own stance on Zionist
issues.44 The paper grew and expanded under Greenberg’s ownership and came to reflect his
particular views more than any establishment or factional perspective. Greenberg was devoted to
Jewish nationalism, both in the interests of creating a Jewish state and fighting assimilation in the
diaspora through cultural regeneration.45 This attitude would later bring him and the Jewish
Chronicle into conflict with the Zionist establishment over Zionist efforts in Palestine.
Greenberg and the Chronicle were positioned from the start to oppose Weizmann and his
leanings. As one of Uganda’s largest proponents and its most prominent actor, Greenberg took
personal issue with Weizmann’s role in the defeat of the proposal. Weizmann noted in his
autobiography:
My opposition to the Uganda offer had made Greenberg my enemy, and we never
established friendly relations again. When I settled permanently in England, Greenberg
did his best to keep me out of the movement; he succeeded, certainly, in preventing me
for a long time from developing close contact with the London Zionists, and the Jewish
Chronicle remained consistently hostile to me.46
While Greenberg opposed Weizmann, he, like Gaster and Wolffsohn, earnestly strove to advance
Zionism. Although Weizmann’s approach ultimately succeeded, the Balfour Declaration rested
on a series of contingencies unimaginable to Zionists working prior to the outbreak of the First
World War.
Scholars continued to take a dismal view of British Zionists despite the undeniable work
they had accomplished prior to Weizmann’s arrival. In David Cesarani’s essay, “One Hundred
Years of Zionism in England,” he suggested that prior to 1917, English Zionism was “a
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backwater of no importance.”47 Eugene Black’s “A Typological Study of English Zionists” made
much of the infighting and purported general disfunction of the English Zionist Federation and
the large personalities involved. In so doing, he perpetuated the Weizmann myth. Black noted:
In a profound way, no one else [but Weizmann] could do it [influence British leadership
to the Zionist position], a curious reflection of the culture and psychology of English
Zionists. Those who led the fight for political Zionism displayed ambition, intellect and
commitment in equal measure with political clumsiness, insensitivity, and an incapacity
to subordinate themselves to their cause.48
Black’s perspective unironically evoked the heroic mythology Renton summarized when he
added, “Single-handedly he [Weizmann] changed the future of the nation and brought it to the
crest of what was constructed as the beginning of the redemption and rebirth.”49 It was certainly
difficult for Weizmann, a newly-immigrated Russian Jewish scientist now living in Manchester,
to ascend to the heights he reached without assistance. Those very same English Zionists to
whom Black ascribed “substantial talent, excessive ego, and a predilection for quarrelsomeness”
were pivotal in putting Weizmann in the position to ultimately succeed.50
Weizmann’s Early Years: 1904-1913
Travelling to England in 1904, Weizmann recorded a gloomy picture of his relationship
with the English Zionists writ large upon his arrival. He noted:
I found myself isolated, socially, intellectually and morally. There was a certain
bitterness among many Zionists who attributed the untimely death of Herzl to the
stubbornness of the anti-Ugandists.… My isolation grew deeper and more complete, and
I came to the conclusion that in the circumstances the best thing I could do was to keep
away from the unpleasant and unprofitable strife which was being waged around ideas
which meant little or nothing to me.51
47

David Cesarani, “One Hundred Years of Zionism in England," European Judaism: A Journal for the New
Europe 25, no. 1 (1992), 42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41443082.
48
Eugene Black, “A Typological Study of English Zionists,” Jewish Social Studies 9, no. 3 (2003), 21,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4467655.
49
James Renton, “Reconsidering Weizmann and Gaster” in Nationalism, Zionism and Ethnic Mobilization of the
Jews in 1900 and Beyond, ed. Michael Berkowitz (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 131.
50
Black, “Typological Study,” 20.
51
Weizmann, Trial and Error, 95.

British Zionists and the Balfour Declaration: 1905-191

24

This led Weizmann to settle far from the center of Zionist efforts in London, taking up residence
in the northern city of Manchester. Given his geographic position and frame of mind at the time,
he focused on chemistry rather than Zionism. Only in 1905 and 1906 did Weizmann begin to
integrate with the English Zionists, beginning with the local Zionist scene in Manchester. He
recorded, “Slowly Manchester became a center of Zionists thought which was destined, after
months and years and laborious effort, to spread its influence throughout the surrounding towns
and to leave its impression on English Zionism as a whole.”52
Before he could truly enter the fray that was Anglo-Jewish communal politics, Weizmann
made two important acquaintances that would shape his future as a Zionist and a man of politics.
The first was Ahad Ha’am, who he had known for many years but had also recently relocated to
England, hailing from Russia originally. Ahad Ha’am was neither a political or a practical
Zionist, but could perhaps be labelled a cultural Zionist, concerned primarily with the
rejuvenation of Jewish thought. Black wrote, “Weizmann had discovered a new counselor, Ahad
Ha-am [sic], and emancipation from the ever acerbic-Gaster,” suggesting that Gaster and Ahad
Ha’am could fill similar roles in Weizmann’s career.53 Weizmann himself demonstrated this to
be false when he observed, “I thought of him always as the philosopher, not a man of action,”
illustrating that Ahad Ha’am could never fill the ally role Weizmann needed in English Zionist
circles.
The second important acquaintance was more significant, given his powerful position as
prime minister. Through Charles Dreyfus, chairman of the Manchester Zionist Society,
Weizmann was able to meet with Arthur James Balfour in 1906 while the latter was in
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Manchester on the campaign trail for the general election. Over the course of the conversation,
Weizmann found Balfour a ready listener, even if Balfour was ill-informed on the subject of
Zionism and puzzled over many Jews’ dislike for the Uganda plan.54 Weizmann saw this
conversation as a turning point. He wrote, “I was drawn again into Zionist activity by my feeling
that the time was ripe for the thoroughgoing change in the character of the movement.… The
conversation with Balfour… was like a tocsin or alarm. I was not free to choose my course of
action.”55
Given his status in the Jewish community in Britain and his status among British
Zionists, Moses Gaster was the first figure Weizmann approached when he began to integrate
into the London Zionists scene. Weizmann wrote of Gaster in 1904 in a letter to fellow Russian
Zionist Menahem Ussishkin, “He is more intelligent than the others [the English Zionist leaders]
and the cause above all is dear to him, and he sees all the emerging problems clearly. He sees all
the difficulties, and is above petty political intrigue.”56 Weizmann worked from his solid base
with the Manchester Zionists to enable Gaster to win the presidency of the English Zionist
Federation in 1907, extending into 1908. Weizmann served as vice president. Zionists at the
Eighth Zionist Congress at The Hague in 1907 received a positive report on Zionism in England.
They heard, “In England the devoted zeal of the Zionists has removed the difficulties which
formerly existed. The Federation worked systematically and well, and the Movement had
received a considerable impetus.”57 However, the fortunes of Zionism in England were hardly to
maintain a consistent upward trajectory.
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English Zionists did not represent a monolithic ideological bloc, and while figures like
Greenberg, Gaster, and Herbert Bentwich were all devoted Zionists, they did not necessarily
agree on matters of policy or method. According to Cohen, Gaster and Greenberg represented the
largest fault line, drawing their enmity as far back as 1902 when Greenberg favored accepting
the East Africa offer and Gaster favored rejection.58 By 1906, the rift had led to two distinct
camps within the EZF, making Gaster’s presidency in 1907 all the more impressive. Black noted,
“[Joseph] Cowen, meanwhile, launched a Greenberg-ite counterattack at the 1909 Sheffield
annual EZF meeting. He savaged Gaster’s style, his ineffective management, the falloff in
membership, and the rise of EZF expenses. Every charge was true.”59 Gaster maintained the
presidency by one vote, but English Zionism at the highest levels continued to be plagued with
infighting.
Many sources suggest that Moses Gaster’s personality was the cause for his gradual
dissent from the heights of leadership he achieved in the Zionist movement. Black wrote,
“Gaster… complained about everything and quarreled with almost everyone. From an
institutional perspective, he proved at best a nuisance and at worst a major hazard to those causes
into which he flung himself with such abandon.”60 Weizmann too observed, “He was a good
Zionist but suffered, I believe from jealousy.”61 However, Renton, Berkowitz, and others worked
to ameliorate these criticisms of Gaster. Leonard Stein, later to be Weizmann’s personal
secretary, wrote of Gaster in The Balfour Declaration, “Long before the War his powerful
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personality, his imposing presence and his gifts of oratory… made him an important figure at
Zionist Congresses and on Zionist platforms in England and abroad.”62 Renton observed:
If personal faults such as [those ascribed to Gaster] would discount an individual of
having any political worth or historical significance, then a great number of Zionist
leaders, including Weizmann, would have to be discounted out of hand.63
Ultimately, the focus in the historical record on Gaster’s personality is a part of the Weizmann
myth designed to denigrate Gaster’s role in the story of Zionism.
Weizmann’s dislike for Gaster as the years progressed was assuredly mutual, as
Berkowitz sought to demonstrate. Weizmann was not always a good friend to Gaster. Notable
Weizmann biographer Jehuda Reinharz recounted an instance of Weizmann asking Gaster for a
loan during his early years in England.64 While insignificant at face value, Berkowitz further
probed the depths of Gaster’s generosity and Weizmann’s willingness to take advantage.
Berkowitz said, “Weizmann asked for the equivalent of £20,000. Gaster gave him… £4000 [sic].
Then he gave him another £6000 from a friend. This is a lot of money to give to one person.
There is no mention of Weizmann ever paying it back, or even attempting to do so.”65 By 1911,
the friction between Gaster and Greenberg had grown to the point of Gaster’s faction coalescing
into a previously extant group, the Order of Ancient Maccabeans, distinct from the EZF. This
downward trend in Gaster’s relationship with the EZF eventually led in 1913 to Joseph Cowen’s
election as president, and Weizmann’s acceptance as vice president, a betrayal of his longtime
ally.66 Berkowitz recorded Gaster going further into his personal evaluations of Weizmann by
quoting Gaster’s dictated memoirs: “His ways always… devious, his actions have always been
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subterranean and… Herzl, already in former times, called by one name [sic]: ‘the intriguer’. This
he has been from the beginning and will remain to the last.”67 Though Gaster felt strongly about
Weizmann and the future of Zionism under his leadership, he was never forceful enough to sway
the opinions of the historians who enshrined the Weizmann myth.
The First World War
Over the course of World War 1, the Zionist movement experienced a rapid shift in
fortunes, beginning with unexpected challenges and emerging at the end of the war in the best
position it had yet experienced. Although Herbert Samuel, the only Jewish member of the British
Cabinet upon the outbreak of war, saw the Ottoman Empire’s involvement with the Central
Powers as an opportunity to blend Zionist aims with British policy goals, the World Zionist
Organization itself was in no position in 1914 to capitalize on these developments.68 David
Wolffsohn passed away shortly after the Eleventh Zionist Congress of 1913, leaving the WZO
without a clear leader when the movement needed one most. The war that divided Europe was to
have a similar effect on Zionism’s primarily European membership.
Sokolow summed up the position of Jews during the First World War, writing, “The
nations were divided one from another, Jewry was divided against itself.… It almost seemed as
though there existed Jews, and divided Jews, but no Jewry.”69 Zionism was an international
movement, with membership from Allied and Central Powers alike, placing the movement in a
difficult position. The nationalism that enveloped European nations across the continent affected
the Zionists residing within those nations. Specifically, Jews in Austria, Germany, and Britain all
shared a dislike for the Russian Empire, given its reputation for horrible mistreatment of its
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Jewish population.70 Nonetheless, when Britain joined the war effort against Germany, siding
with Russia, the Jewish Chronicle supported the move, noting, “But it is difficult to suppose that
when the sword returns to its scabbard all the fraternisations of the war and all the sacrifices of
the many thousands of Jewish troops will be forgotten, and the old weary round of restrictions,
tempered by blood libels, will be resumed.”71 Sokolow’s observations proved accurate, as Jews
fought on both sides of the conflict.
Jewish participation in the war effort, especially in Britain, became a keystone of Zionist
propaganda efforts. The Chronicle reported, “We are gratified to know that Jews have enlisted so
well in the forces despite the unfair and discouraging taunts against our people, and the help they
are giving to the War, that has found place in certain journals, especially in the provinces.”72 The
Jewish Legion of Great Britain also received widespread local acclaim, but Berkowitz observed
that this sort of propaganda effort could not serve Zionists outside of Britain.73 The nationalist
character of Zionist propaganda, varying from country to country damaged the international
character of the Zionist movement and began to push the focus of its western European
constituents further towards Great Britain.
In an effort to restore Zionism’s international character, English Zionists Leopold
Greenberg and Joseph Cowen proposed relocating Zionist headquarters to a neutral site such as
The Hague.74 This move could have kept the Zionist Organization from coming under fire for
supposed German alignment, but it never took place. Notably, Weizmann became one of the
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biggest proponents for Zionist alignment with the Allies and Britain particularly. Going over the
Zionist chain of command, he began to negotiate with those close to power within British
Government. Barnet Litvinoff noted in an introductory section in The Letters and Papers of
Chaim Weizmann, “He had no constitutional power to negotiate, for he ranked only as a member
of the G.A.C. [Greater Actions Committee] and a Vice-President of the E.Z.F.”75 The breakdown
of the international Zionist organization enabled British Zionists and Weizmann to embark on an
independent course that would ultimately prove quite fruitful.
The route to the 1917 Balfour Declaration is a complex story, and Leonard Stein’s
seminal monograph on the subject spans hundreds of pages. From the perspective of Weizmann
and the British Zionists however, the story can be distilled into a series of negotiations with
prominent politicians to sway them to the opinion that Zionism could be synthesized with British
policy aims. Weizmann mostly conducted these negotiations himself, but could not have done so
without the assistance of the more established British Zionists, especially Gaster.
Weizmann was able to meet David Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel during the war,
finding both disposed to aid the Zionist cause. While living in Manchester, Weizmann had made
a friend of C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian. Scott became an ally of Zionism and
told Weizmann, “I would like to bring you together with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd
George,” also informing him of Samuel’s involvement in Government.76 Weizmann said of
Samuel, “For God’s sake, Mr. Scott, let’s have nothing to do with this man,” assuming Samuel
would be a staunch anti-Zionist like the other established and assimilated British Jews he had
encountered thus far.77 Weizmann was to be pleasantly surprised when he met with Scott,
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Samuel, and Lloyd George on December 3, 1914. While Lloyd George demonstrated great
interest in Zionist activities and plans for Palestine, it was Samuel who shocked Weizmann most
with his clear Zionist leanings. In a report to the Zionist Executive from January 7, 1915,
Weizmann recounted his discussion with Samuel, noting, “He was not a stranger to Zionist ideas;
he had been following them up a little of late years, and although he had never publicly
mentioned it, he took a considerable interest in the question.… He thought that a realization of
the Zionist dreams was possible.”78 Indeed, Samuel was then preparing to submit a memorandum
to the Cabinet on synthesizing Zionist and British aims in Palestine in a future peace settlement
with the Ottoman Empire.79 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith did not prove to be a supporter of
the movement, but Weizmann had found two ready listeners who would prove quite efficacious
for Zionism’s future in Samuel and Lloyd George.
Samuel had taken an active interest in Zionism prior to his first meeting with
Weizmann.80 Aside from Weizmann, whom Samuel indicated was certainly a known element in
Zionist ranks by this period, he also looked to Gaster. Indeed, Samuel considered Gaster as a
man with good political sense and knowledge of the movement, turning to him for articles and
resources in preparation for his Cabinet memorandum.81 The two had been friends prior to
Samuel’s first meeting with Weizmann, and their friendship would continue to shape the
development of what would become the Balfour Declaration. Indeed, Sokolow observed, “Dr.
Gaster, too, in conjunction with Dr. Weizmann, had some important conversations with English
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leaders,” dispelling the notion that Weizmann was the sole Zionist functionary during the
negotiations leading up to the Declaration.82
Another British official, Sir Mark Sykes became one of the most significant British
officials involved in the Balfour Declaration. Sokolow wrote in his tribute, “He was a man who
has won a monument in the future Pantheon of the Jewish people and of who legends will be told
in Palestine, Arabia, and Armenia.”83 Prior to his conversion to Zionism however, Sykes had
been involved in a prior secret agreement with the French over the future territorial distribution
of the Middle East, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. Weizmann explained, “France
was to obtain, after the war, not only northern Syria, but Palestine down to a line from St. Jean
d’Arcre (Acco) to Lake Tiberias, including the Hauran; the rest of Palestine was to be
internationalized,” proving incompatible with Zionist aims by this point.84 While Samuel’s
above-mentioned memorandum could hardly be construed as an official policy, his words on the
subject in his memoirs reflect the milieu among Zionist sympathizers in British government at
the time. He observed, “Opinion was crystallizing in favour of something in the nature of a
British Protectorate [in Palestine],” rather than internationalizing the territory, and employing
British influence to further Zionist aims without angering the Arab majority.85 The British had to
abrogate the Sykes-Picot Agreement to advance Zionism under their guidance, and Mark Sykes
needed to be convinced of the rightness of this policy direction.
Even prior to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Sykes had been made aware of Zionism
through Samuel’s earlier memorandum. Renton commented, “When Sykes returned to London
he asked Samuel to put him in touch with a Zionist leader whom he could hold discussions. The
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individual recommended by Samuel was Moses Gaster, whom he had known for many years.”86
Samuel had met with Weizmann by this point but continued to see Gaster as the best example of
Zionism to offer. Stein wrote, “What is not altogether clear is why Samuel put Gaster in touch
with him [Sykes], but not Weizmann or Sokolow, though these were, in fact, the most
authoritative representatives of the Movement in England at the time,” acknowledging that
Samuel, by 1954, had no recollection of the incident.87In any case, Sykes acknowledged Gaster’s
influence in a speech at the London Opera House on December 2, 1917, saying:
I should like to say, before I say another word, that the reason I am interested in this
Movement is that I met one some two years ago who is now upon this platform who
opened my eyes to what this Movement meant.… I mean Dr. Gaster88
As in the case of the negotiations with Samuel, it is misguided to regard Weizmann as the sole
negotiator with British officials like Sykes. Indeed, the only official mentioned thus far over
whom Weizmann likely had full influential capacity was Lloyd George, given Weizmann’s
chemical aid to the war effort and Lloyd George’s later position as the Minister of Munitions.
Renton ascribed Gaster’s influence on Sykes as largely relating to his negotiating
strategy. He explained of Sykes motivations:
Despite Samuel’s discussions of the benefits of a British protectorate over Palestine after
the war, this was not a concern to Sykes at this point. Indeed, as with the deliberations of
the Foreign Office at this time on the subject of Zionism, his key interest was in gaining
the support of the world Jewry, particularly in the United States.89
Gaster keenly understood this, and played into Sykes’ assumptions and hopes during their
discussions. Renton noted, “He had endorsed and consolidated their [Sykes and Picot]
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conceptions of what was at stake, Jewish influence, and how it could be tied to the Allied cause,
Zionism.”90 Sykes wasn’t a British pragmatic Zionist like Samuel, a philosophically minded
sympathizer like Balfour, or a romantic like Lloyd George. He wanted to use Zionist aims as a
bargaining piece with the other Allied Powers, and Gaster was able to feed him what he wanted
to hear. Black ascribed this kind of negotiating tactic to Weizmann, who also exaggerated
international Jewish power for strategic purposes, but this example once again illustrates
Weizmann was hardly alone in doing so, and not always the most influential.91
By 1917, events like the British occupation of Palestine and Lloyd George’s late 1916
ascension to the Prime Ministry advanced the Zionist cause within British Government but
largely without any direct Zionist influence. With Balfour in Government as Lloyd George’s
Foreign Secretary, the players were in position to formulate the famous declaration. With the
help of Mark Sykes’ persuasive ability, the declaration came in the form of a letter to Lord
Walter Rothchild on November 2, 1917.92 The Balfour Declaration read:
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.93
It was the final triumph of Herzl’s vision of official recognition for a Jewish establishment,
Samuel’s aims for a British protectorate, and Sykes’ goal of a propaganda piece. Upon its
issuance, Sykes jubilantly informed Weizmann, “It’s a boy!” to which Weizmann noted in his
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autobiography, “I did not like the boy at first. He was not the one I had expected. But I knew this
was a great departure.”94 As for Gaster, Renton noted:
“He saw the eventual result, the Balfour Declaration, as a deliberately vague and tenuous
document that was issued to justify British occupation of Palestine and gain the support
of Jewry in the war, but did not constitute any tangible achievement of the goals of the
Zionist Organisation and the realization of the Basle program.95
Nonetheless, Jews at large rejoiced, and the Balfour Declaration became entrenched in Zionist
mythology thereafter. Weizmann achieved widespread acclaim for the achievement which he
was later able to parlay into his rise to the presidency of the WZO in 1920.96 He had achieved
what Herzl and Wolfssohn had failed to do. Through the Balfour Declaration a compromise
between East and West was achieved; Eastern and Western Zionism were united under one
policy.
Conclusion
Tracing the long and winding road from Herzl’s initial conception of modern political
Zionism to the Balfour Declaration demonstrates many of the explanatory gaps in the mythology
of Chaim Weizmann’s meteoric rise to the heights of Zionist leadership. As is the case in many
mythologized narratives of a charismatic hero, Weizmann’s story relied on numerous supporting
characters and oftentimes chance luck for him to achieve all that he did between his arrival in
England and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. At minimum, working through the details
omitted in the mythos helps to challenge Black’s statement that “no one else could do it,” in
reference to Weizmann’s negotiating capacity with British leaders and rise to prominence on the
British Zionist scene.
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From the very moment Weizmann met Balfour in 1906 to his meetings with Sykes in
1916, forgotten British Zionists had worked diligently to help proliferate Zionist ideas to the
highest ranks of British society. Though Balfour possessed only a cursory understanding of
Zionism in 1906, his knowledge stemmed from the well-publicized Uganda plan that Greenberg
had campaigned for so determinedly. Though a failure at face value, Greenberg’s efforts and his
connection with Joseph Chamberlain ensured that British officials for the next several years were
at least familiar with the Zionist Movement and some of its aims. So too was the case for Herbert
Samuel and Mark Sykes, who each received much of their formative instruction in Zionism from
Moses Gaster, the archetypal figure harmed in the Weizmann mythos. All of this is to say
nothing of the great efforts of Gaster, Greenberg, and others like Herbert Bentwich and Joseph
Cowen to enhance Zionism’s standing in the difficult arena of Anglo-Jewish communal politics
before and after Weizmann came to England.
To be sure, Weizmann deserves credit in the development of the Balfour Declaration and
the trajectory of the Zionist Movement during the period. He can fairly be said to be the single
most important actor among the Zionists during the First World War. However, Weizmann’s
story should not diminish the contributions of those who helped him achieve his position,
especially when doing so often serves only to enhance Weizmann’s reputation and legacy.
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British Zionists and the Jewish National Home: 1920-1929
Following the period of diffuse national-oriented Zionism that typified the war years, the
1920s resumed the international characteristics of the movement, with some important
institutions relocated to Palestine. The decade also saw the rise in the importance of the
American movement to the WZO, leading to historical approaches that paint the struggles of the
decade as a conflict between “east” and “west.” The late 20th century saw numerous monographs
and articles covering the struggles of the Zionist Organization in the 1920s, such as Michael
Berkowitz’ 1997 Western Jewry and the Zionist Project: 1914-1933, Ben Halpern’s 1987 A
Clash of Heroes, and George Berlin’s 1970 article “The Brandeis-Weizmann Dispute.” Similar
to the Weizmann myth in the previous chapter overshadowing the stories of British Zionists and
their role in the movement, the emphasis on Europe vs. America in the 1920s overlooks the
continued pivotal role British Zionists played in the changing nature of the Zionist movement
with its new responsibilities of what Weizmann termed national upbuilding. Indeed, British
Zionists continued to play important roles within the changing Zionist institutions, supporting the
movement through one of its most challenging decades.
Introduction
“A new chapter had opened for us, full of new difficulties, but not without its great
moments,” Weizmann stated after the Balfour Declaration.1 Even before he could begin work as
the WZO’s new president in 1920, the seeds were sewn for a period of great challenges to come.
The Balfour Declaration could only take effect at the close of the First World War, and the
circumstances between 1917 and the peace settlement in 1920 shaped a situation far from ideal
for the Zionist work the movement envisioned.
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Arab-Jewish Relations
The first of these challenges arose almost as soon as the British occupied then-Turkish
Palestine in 1917, when General Allenby conquered the province and initiated a military
administration. Allenby observed the Hague Convention* guidelines rigidly, maintaining the
preexisting status quo to avoid charges of misconduct from the French, often to the detriment of
Zionist aims.2 For instance, the Chief Administrators, Generals Money, Watson, and Bols,
refused to publish the Balfour Declaration in Palestine.3 The prevalent tendencies within the
military administration were predisposed towards an anti-Zionist position, and whether
intentionally or not, its actions prior to the advent of the civil administration in 1920 soured
relations between Jews and Arabs.
Importantly, some Arab luminaries in Palestine were receptive towards the ideas in the
Balfour Declaration and the Zionist aims at large. Indeed, King Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca
defended the Balfour Declaration in 1918 through the al-Qibia, a Palestinian newspaper, writing
that Palestine was “‘a sacred and beloved homeland… [of] its original sons—the Jews.’”4
Hussein had never met with any Zionists, and his assessments likely stemmed from independent
readings of the Koran that supported the Zionist message. 5 Hussein passed on his interpretation
to his son, Emir Faisal, who would play an important role in the geopolitical landscape of Arabia
in the coming years.
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In 1918, Weizmann headed the Zionist Commission in Palestine, leaving behind his
diplomatic position in London to handle affairs on the ground. Weizmann encountered the
realities of the military administration regarding the Balfour Declaration. He recorded that:
The Balfour Declaration… had never reached many of Allenby’s officers.… They knew
nothing about it, and nothing about the sympathy shown at that time to our aims and
aspirations among prominent Englishmen of every walk of life.6
Weizmann and his allies in Palestine soon found that extracts of the famed anti-Semitic text, the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* were circulating within the British Military Administration.7
Weizmann expressed these concerns in his Report to the Special Zionist Conference in London
on 2 November 1918, albeit in more muted tones. The report noted, “The arrival of the
Commission in Palestine… rendered the position of the British authorities more difficult.… We
were spoken of as the Jews who came to Palestine to oust the poor Arab fellaheen† from their
land,” alluding to the British mismanagement of information.8 Weizmann blunted his critique,
saying, “The British authorities did their best to counteract all these vague rumours and all these
insinuations, but first, they had not sufficient time to devote to this object, and secondly, they
were not themselves sufficiently informed…to counteract all these vague and wrongful
rumours.”9 Despite Weizmann’s careful tact in the report, both it and his reflections in Trial and
Error illustrate the broad scholarly consensus that the military administration in Palestine had
heightened the difficulties associated with the already challenging prospect of Arab-Jewish
friendship.
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Weizmann and the Commission also came into contact with the local Arab population
and its dignitaries. He remarked in his autobiography, “Conversation and negotiation with Arabs
are not unlike chasing a mirage in the desert: full of promise and good to look at, but likely to
lead you to death by thirst.”10 While this observation pertained to the Commission’s discussions
in Egypt, he was keen to recognize obstacles involved in rapprochement with Arabs across the
region. Weizmann “judged Syrian leaders, Christian Arab landowners, and local Palestinian
notables to be hostile and responsive to French-instigated propaganda.”11 The Commission’s
report to the Special Zionist Conference in 1918 distinguished between the fellaheen and the
Effendis,º whom they judged to be the more dangerous of the two to Zionist activity. The report
stated, “Their schemes are as much anti-Jewish as they were anti-British.… It is they who raised
all the dust in the Press.”12 Despite concern over Arab notables, Weizmann believed he had
found an understanding ear in the person of Emir Faisal, King Hussein’s son. Weizmann met
Faisal in June of 1918, while the latter was serving his father as a military commander. The
minutes from the discussion noted, “Shereef [sic] Faisal expressed his opinion of the necessity
for cooperation between Jews and Arabs. He referred to the historical tradition of both races, and
at the present time the need for close cooperation was necessary for both.”13 The report from
later that year reflected this cordiality, relating that Weizmann “was given the opportunity clearly
to explain to him our aims and intentions, and I am authorized to state that we fully understood
each other, and I think all these doubts and all these misinterpretations have totally
disappeared.”14 The Commission’s work by the end of 1918 had uncovered evidence of serious
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obstacles relating to both Arab and British Military attitudes to the Zionist project, but the
general attitude remained cautiously optimistic.
Zionist optimism about Arab rapprochement and British military cooperation suffered a
major blow in 1919. Indeed, the origin of the Arab riots in Jerusalem in 1920 linked to the
British Military Administration in 1919. The military administration theorized a union of
Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia under Arab rule and under British protection; the British
Government never approved this plan.15 Emir Faisal, who had previously been amenable to
Zionist aims, became swayed by this Pan-Arab sentiment.16 The plan failed, and no serious
uprising came to pass, as the riots of 1920 hardly counted as a major insurgency. Weizmann
spoke to Colonel Meinerzhagen, who had uncovered the military administrations’ efforts, and
related their conversation in the Minutes of the Zionist Commission on 25 March. 1920. He
reported, “[Meinerzhagen] explained that amongst officials of the present Administration not one
was friendlily disposed to us.”17 At this point, Faisal was pushing for a United Syria, under
which he would serve as king; Weizmann remarked of General Allenby’s discussions with
Faisal: “It struck me that in these negotiations with Faisal they had quite forgotten us [the
Zionists.]”18 Following these riots and the botched response from the Military Administration,
further cemented through the findings of the Palin Committee, Lloyd George and Lord George
Curzon, then at the San Remo Conference, decided that the time had come to replace the military
administration with a civil administration, which will be discussed in the following chapter.19
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The Arab-Jewish relations that seemed promising in 1918 now looked to be far more treacherous
for the Zionists who were looking ahead to the 1920s.
The Rise of American Zionism
Beyond the challenges associated with increasingly strained Arab-Jewish relations in
Palestine, the second major challenge for the Zionist project came from within the movement
itself. The outbreak of the First World War damaged the international infrastructure of the World
Zionist Movement. Efforts to relocate said infrastructure to a neutral country failed to bring
together the disparate national branches of the movement, and Weizmann and the British
Zionists around him were able to spearhead the diplomacy to achieve the Balfour Declaration.
However, the war also allowed Zionism beyond Europe to grow in prominence and relevance.
The United States, as a neutral power with a vast bastion of Zionists and financial resources, was
poised to elevate a new crop of leaders and ideologies into the fore.
Zionism in the United States had previously faced comparable challenges to Zionists in
Britain, with an overwhelmingly anti-Zionist conservative Jewish base. In the face of these
obstacles, an emergency Zionist Conference in 1914 created the Provisional Committee for
General Zionist Affairs (PZEC), with the goal of raising one hundred thousand dollars for
European relief.20 Convened by American Louis Lipsky and Russian Shmarya Levin, the
conference chose Louis Brandeis as the PZEC’s chairman.21 While working within the American
Jewish Congress (AJC) umbrella, Brandeis was able to use the PZEC to elevate Zionism’s
prestige among American Jewry and raise his own standing within the movement. As the PZEC
continued to prove effective in its mission, the membership of the Federation of American
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Zionists (FAZ) and affiliated groups rose from twelve thousand in 1914 to one hundred fifty
thousand in 1918.22
Louis Brandeis held his position at the forefront of American Zionism from 1914 while
serving on the United States Supreme Court from 1916. His proximity to American government
was important for the Zionist movement, but it also led to charges of incomplete commitment to
the Zionist cause. Lipsky noted in his profile of Brandeis, “In all his past his Jewish heritage had
played no real part except as auxiliary to his basic concepts.… He had to return to his own
people. It was a long distance to go.”23 Like Herzl, Brandeis was an assimilated Jew who faced
an uphill battle in proving his commitment to Zionism. Nonetheless, Brandeis’ personal
leadership qualities were evident even to his critics like Lipsky, who wrote, “He inspired
confidence and optimism with rare skill. He believed from the start that the allies would win and
that one of the fruits of their victory would be the fulfillment of Herzl’s program.”24 Sokolow too
observed:
The statesmanship, the genius of the organization, and the beneficent personal influence
of the Honourable Louis D. Brandeis, Judge of the Supreme Court, has raised,
strengthened, and secured in every direction the position of American Zionism not only
in America, but also has increased its prestige and dignity abroad.25
Brandeis’s increasingly prevalent position in American Zionism and American Zionism’s
increasing importance for the movement at large offered Brandeis an opportunity to push his
views at the Zionist Conference following the end of the war, foreshadowing an eventual
meeting with Weizmann.
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Brandeis and Weizmann communicated regularly as early as 1917 amid diplomacy
surrounding the Balfour Declaration. Weizmann needed American support for a British
Protectorate in Palestine as outlined in what would become the Balfour Declaration, and looked
to Brandeis to use his personal connection with President Wilson to secure such support.26
Brandeis did not immediately acquiesce. In that crucial year, Henry Morganthau travelled to
Turkey to mediate a possible separate peace between the Ottomans and the British, which had it
occurred would have ended any Zionist hopes pinned on the British. Brandeis supported this
venture as an extension of official American foreign policy.27 Weizmann on the other hand was
able to secure a role as Britain’s representative on the mission, and with the help of American
Zionist Felix Frankfurter, successfully prevented the separate peace opportunity between the
Ottoman Empire and Britain.28 As time passed, Brandeis reversed his position to support
Weizmann and the British aim. Weizmann later wrote that Brandeis, “did more than press the
idea of a Jewish Palestine under a British Protectorate. He carried on a general work of
clarification.”29
Weizmann and Brandeis met for the first time in July of 1920 at the first Zionist
Conference in the postwar period. It marked a newfound American prominence in the movement
which had not existed in the prior international Zionist framework. Weizmann and Brandeis had
emerged from the backgrounds of their respective domains to become leaders of European
(though Weizmann’s claim to represent all European Zionism is potentially a stretch) and
American Zionism, respectively. The meeting between the two of them would prove rocky and
the substance of their disagreements would shape Zionist activity over the course of the decade.
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The London Zionist Conference of 1920
At the first united Zionist Conference since the start of the First World War, Weizmann
and Brandeis each put forth their own vision for how the movement should proceed now that
Jewish settlement in Palestine was guaranteed under a British Protectorate. The two leaders had
different conceptions of the role of the Zionist Organization in the coming years, as well as how
the movement should allocate funds raised internationally. As the conference progressed,
Weizmann and Brandeis became increasingly antagonistic, with Weizmann and his positions
becoming the dominant guiding principles for the Zionist Organization during the 1920s.
One of the first points of contention that arose between the Americans and the European
Zionists was the American proposition of dissolving the Zionist Commission and reformulating
the body as a Jewish Advisory Council, working in tandem with the new civil administration in
Palestine. The conference rejected this proposal.30 Brandeis understood the Zionist Commission
to have outlived its purpose, given that the political aims of the Zionist movement had been
fulfilled in the Balfour Declaration.31 Weizmann did not go as far as to say that the political side
of Zionism was at an end, but he noted in a speech to the conference that “our work today is very
different from what it has hitherto been.… The practical work of building up a Jewish Palestine
requires a different kind of machine from that which is called for by propaganda.”32 However,
Weizmann made clear that his time in Palestine with the Zionist Commission, witnessing the
anti-Semitism and poor cultivation of Arab relations under the Military Administration, led him
to conclude, “for those whose facile optimism had led them to believe that all political problems
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were safely, out of the way,” the riots of 1920 should have proven otherwise.33 Over the course
of Weizmann’s career in Zionism, he developed political Zionist leanings almost in equal
measure with his earlier practical Zionist attitudes.34
Another major shift the American proposed was a wholesale reorientation of the Zionist
infrastructure and governing bodies, moving most elements to Palestine and creating a Palestine
Executive to replace the international Zionist Executive. These proposals from the Brandeis
faction fell in line with Weizmann’s ideas about altering Zionist infrastructure for the new tasks
at hand, but controversy arose over who would serve on the Palestine Executive. The Americans
wanted the sole criteria to be efficient service, and that current Zionist officials serving in
Palestine were to be retired.35 This criterion would also allow for non-Zionist Jews to serve on
the Palestine Executive. Weizmann and Sokolow supported Brandeis’ plan privately but upon
seeing the outrage it caused on the floor of the conference, Weizmann chose not to support it
publicly.36 This political maneuver aligned with Moses Gaster’s portrayal of Weizmann’s
character in the previous chapter and negatively affected Brandeis attitude toward Weizmann.
Ultimately, the Palestine Executive became an official body within Zionism, but the Europeans
successfully lobbied to keep the group exclusively under control of Zionist members.
The third and perhaps the most significant point of dispute between Brandeis and
Weizmann at the conference was the issue of fundraising. Brandeis proposed a system of
national Zionist federations that would each raise funds exclusively for practical tasks of
developing infrastructure for Jewish settlement in Palestine.37 Brandeis and the Americans had
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proven during the war that the American Jewish fundraising apparatus was by far the most potent
among any potential national federation, and this proposal explicitly favored the Americans.
Brandeis also dispatched a team of three men known as the Reorganization Commission to
conduct a study on the use of funds in Palestine and Zionist activities therein. They reported their
findings after the American proposal had failed in London, but they found Zionist achievements
to be woefully out of step with the propaganda; they recommended drastic changes that fell on
deaf ears.38 Weizmann opposed the federation approach to fundraising at the London Conference
because he believed it would undermine the power of the WZO and the biennial Zionist
Congress.39 The Europeans ultimately struck down the proposal, though the issue of fundraising
would protract the conflict between Brandeis and Weizmann in the coming year.
With Weizmann and the Europeans ostensibly emerging triumphant over Brandeis and
the Americans in London, the contours of the Zionist movement crystallized for the 1920s. In
1921, Weizmann created the Keren Hayesod,** a centralized fundraising body that amended none
of the concerns the Reorganization Commission raised, which had been published by this point.
Indeed, Berkowitz suggested, “It was, above all, the events surrounding the reaction to the
Reorganization Commission report which prompted Weizmann’s handling of the Keren
Hayesod, and the removal of Brandeis and his ally, Julian Mack, from the leadership of Zionism
in the United States in 1921.”40 Weizmann had consolidated his power over Zionism, with Louis
Lipsky, his trusted ally in control in the United States. To execute his vision, Weizmann looked
westward to many British Zionists who helped staff the new Palestine Executive, raise support

38

Michael Berkowitz, Western Jewry and the Zionist Project, 1914-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 62.
39
Berlin, “The Brandeis-Weizmann Dispute,” 49.
**
The Foundation Fund
40
Berkowitz, Western Jewry, 63.

British Zionists and the Jewish National Home: 1920-1929

48

for the Keren Hayesod, continue the political tasks of the Zionist Movement, and facilitate
détente with the Arabs.
Sir Alfred Mond, later Baron Melchett
An affluent assimilated British Jew, Sir Alfred Mond was a latecomer to the Zionist
movement, one who had not struggled through the early years before the First World War. In the
years following the Balfour Declaration and successful Zionist propaganda, Mond became
sympathetic to the movement. Weizmann told the story of his visit to Palestine in 1920 with
Mond, noting:
Sir Alfred showed himself—hard headed man of affairs that we all took him to be—
profoundly susceptible to the more romantic aspects of the work. I remember still the
shock of astonishment which went through me when, as we stood watching a group of
chalutzimº breaking stones for the road between Petach Tikvah and Jaffa, I observed how
very close he was to tears.41
Clearly Mond came to understand the Zionist project as something of profound importance for
the Jews. Weizmann’s wife Vera said of Mond, “[He] was a financial genius—and an active
supporter of the Palestine to be.”42 He donated handsomely to the movement and eventually
became the president of Weizmann’s new fundraising organization, the Keren Hayesod, in
London.43
Weizmann travelled to the United States in 1921 to press his advantage against the
Brandeis Group and officially create the Keren Hayesod. The organization featured regional
presidents with a headquarters in London. Mond assumed “chairmanship in England of K.H. and
of the Economic Council for Palestine” that same year, making him the most powerful figure
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within the Keren Hayesod structure.44 In an earlier speech in Jerusalem on 30 January 1921
discussing the development of infrastructure, Weizmann expressed confidence in Mond and his
handling of the Keren, noting, “We still have to organize the work and find the means. I am an
optimist.…Sir Alfred Mond and his friends will watch the situation, and they will organize the
work. Our means are limited, but we are richer than the rich Jews. Our treasury is the whole
nation.”45 With fundraising as a chief concern for Weizmann at the start of the 1920s given his
priorities at the 1920 London Conference, his trust in Mond to handle the issue takes on added
significance.
Despite the confidence Weizmann showed in Mond at Jerusalem, Weizmann spoke very
differently when making a statement for the ZOA National Executive Committee in New York
on 10 April, 1921. In noting the incumbent fundraising responsibilities for Jews worldwide,
Weizmann said, “It is the soul behind the machine which has made the machine go. Mond is a
greater financier than I, but without us, Mond is impossible. And without me, Mond is zero.”46
Based on this statement and his scant acknowledgement of Mond in Trial and Error, Weizmann
evidently did not consider the contributions of bureaucratic functionaries to be on the same level
as the those of the political figures within the Zionism movement.
Even after 1926, when the Keren Hayesod headquarters were relocated to Palestine,
Mond continued to serve in his capacity with diligence and efficiency. The Jewish Chronicle
printed a speech Mond delivered to the Jews of New York on 23 September 1923, in which he
explained,
The Keren Hayesod was carrying out the purpose of its founders, and serving the needs
of the Jewish Homeland to the extent of the means which the Jewish people were placed
at its disposal. It was receiving and caring for the incoming immigrants at the stations in
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Jaffa and Haifa, looking after their health and providing them with employment. It was
supporting a network of thirty-five Hebrew schools.47
Notwithstanding Mond’s clear interest in marketing the Keren for his audience, his optimism and
confidence in the success of the enterprise had not diminished from his start in 1921. He made
clear his deep personal feelings for the movement and his mission in an interview with The New
Palestine that same year, when he said:
Is it not indeed a great idea, the consummation and fruition of which we are witnessing in
wonder and amasement to-day, an idea which the sword and fire, dungeon and
persecution, have been powerless to kill? What is called Zionism is the oldest Nationalist
movement in the world.48
Although finances fluctuated, as evidenced in a sharp decline reported from October of 1925, the
Keren Hayesod under Mond was undoubtedly progressing in the direction Weizmann had
originally envisioned.49 Mond shared Weizmann’s conviction that developing the Jewish
National Home first required funds, later coupled with individual and group labor effort.
In addition to his position as head of the Keren Hayesod, Mond’s name was on the short
list for candidates to fill the proposed Jewish agency. First introduced in 1923, the Jewish
Agency as stipulated fulfilled many of the original interests Brandeis had voiced in 1920—the
Agency would be constituted separately from the Zionist Organization and would function in
Palestine to represent the Jews before the Mandate Government.50 The provisional memorandum
from 18 December 1923 indicated that Albert Einstein and Alfred Mond had each accepted
positions on the agency, with Mond calling it, “one of the greatest honours that that can be
conferred on me to serve on a Board of that kind.”51 The Jewish Agency fulfilled its initial
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promise in 1929, realizing Brandeis’ objective of including non-Zionists in the organization.
Mond, who in 1928 received the title 1st Baron Melchett, was elected as chairman of the council,
alongside Weizmann as President.52 Despite the undoubted importance Melchett placed in his
position in the Agency, he resigned from his post alongside Weizmann in 1930 amid tension and
dissatisfaction with the British Government.53 Though Melchett became part of the Agency on
the basis of his financial acumen, his role in the Zionist Organization beyond serving as president
of the Keren Hayesod demonstrated that he was not “zero” without Weizmann.
Beyond Melchett’s organizational contributions to the Zionist efforts through the
positions he held within various bodies, he was also one of the greatest individual philanthropists
in Palestine during the decade. Vera Weizmann noted, “He [Melchett] bought large tracts land, a
few thousand dunam,* and called it Tel Mond, his object being to parcel it out and make it
possible for various people to buy enough land to settle on.”54 Founded in 1929, Tel Mond still
stands in the state of Israel today. The Jewish Chronicle recorded Melchett’s agricultural
undertaking at Tel Mond, “Palestine Plantations Limited,” the country’s “first large-scale citrous
[sic] development company.”55 In demonstration of Melchett’s evident generosity, the Jerusalem
correspondent for the Chronicle highlighted that “the most striking feature [of the company] is
perhaps the evidence of close attention that has been paid to the welfare of the labourers. These
are all, of course, Jewish.”56 Given the importance of agricultural development in Palestine for
Zionist propaganda in the 1920s, Melchett’s citrus company at Tel Mond was an important, if
limited, realization of these goals.
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Sir Alfred Mond served the Zionist cause in both public and private capacities throughout
the 1920s. Particularly in his public roles as president of the Keren Hayesod and his involvement
with the Jewish Agency, Mond was a functionary, known for his keen financial sense.
Weizmann and the upper echelon of leadership undoubtedly valued Mond’s contributions to the
movement, but could not see him as valuable without the political leadership above him. Mond
never became an ideologue within the Zionist movement like Weizmann or Brandeis.
Nonetheless, his contributions make him an important inclusion within the ranks of British
Zionists who left their mark on the movement and on the development of the Jewish National
Home.
Leopold Greenberg
Although Leopold Greenberg abandoned his official position within the English Zionist
institutions, he remained a strong voice for Zionist issues through his newspaper, the Jewish
Chronicle. Given that the Balfour Declaration and subsequent Zionist triumphs at the peace
conferences “acted as powerful inducements to a growth of Zionist influence and prestige within
the Anglo-Jewish community,” Greenberg and his Chronicle were positioned to provide
information on the movement to an expanding Anglo-Jewish readership.57 Cesarani observed,
“The paper fostered public interest in the Yishuv, the modern Palestinian Jewish community, by
its increased coverage of Palestine affairs and illustrated features. This positive depiction of
Zionist work was vital for sustaining fund-raising efforts, which Weizmann well understood.”58
Greenberg provided a consistent, if opinionated, propaganda outlet for the Zionist mission,
helping to normalize interest in the movement throughout the Anglo-Jewish community.
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Greenberg had nursed a dislike for Weizmann since the Uganda Proposal failed, and the
Balfour Declaration was not significant enough to change his opinion. In a letter to Israel
Zangwill in 1919, Greenberg expressed his concerns about the vagaries of the Balfour
Declaration and his fears that the British would go back on their commitment, noting, “Of
course, technically they [the British Government] are unimpeachable because the wording of the
Declaration can mean so little, while it was intended to mean so much.”59 Greenberg was a
proponent of the ultimate goal of a true Jewish state from the outset, and he worried Weizmann
had asked for too little.
The Jewish Chronicle conducted an interview with Emir Faisal during his trip to London
in 1919, seemingly reinforcing Greenberg’s fears that Weizmann had misrepresented the Zionist
aim to the leader of the Arab Nationalist movement. Faisal said:
Palestine is and must remain part and parcel of Syria.…From the point of view of the
Arab, Palestine is a province, not a country, and our intention is to build up an Arab
Empire which must consist, as a minimum, of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine.60
The Emir’s conception was clearly out of step with what Greenberg believed the arrangement to
be, and the Chronicle’s representative was all the more surprised when Faisal declared he had no
objection to Weizmann’s proposals when the two had discussed Palestine.61 Faisal understood
Weizmann’s aspirations to increase Jewish immigration to Palestine, attain equal rights for Jews
in the land, and provide for a renaissance of Hebrew and Jewish culture; he added, “When some
Zionists speak about Palestine becoming as Jewish as England is English… they are really
talking unreasonably.”62 This interview confirmed to Greenberg his mistrust of Weizmann and
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the Balfour Declaration, and Greenberg printed numerous critiques of the Zionist leader both in
the wake of this interview and over the course of the decade, many of which will be covered in
the following chapter. However, despite his personal feelings toward Weizmann and his policies,
Greenberg nonetheless used his paper to support numerous Zionist initiatives during the 1920s.
As early as October of 1920, the Jewish Chronicle began regular advertisements and
spreads dedicated to the fundraising initiatives of the Keren Hayesod, providing valuable
publicity to the Anglo-Jewish readership. The October 1, 1920 issue of the Chronicle dedicated
half a page of the newspaper to print the “Manifesto by the Zionist Executive: Appeal for Funds”
under the headline, “The Future of Palestine,” making Weizmann and the leadership’s plea
exceedingly clear.63 Weizmann recognized Greenberg’s contributions in a 1923 letter prior to a
major Keren fundraising drive, noting, “I feel sure that you can render inestimable service at this
critical juncture by leading public opinion in the direction which I mentioned to you.”64 On
March 16, 1923, the Chronicle proudly proclaimed:
This fund, popularly known as the Keren Hayesod, now exceeds the large sum of threequarters of a million sterling. To have gathered in that amount since the foundation of the
fund forms something more than a great achievement. It gives evidence of the deep-laid
enthusiasm which pervades the Jewish people in the work of the upbuilding of the Land
of Israel.65
Weizmann staked much of his claim to the presidency at the 1920 London Conference on the
success of the Keren Hayesod, and for Greenberg and the Chronicle to label it a resounding
success in 1923 helped to affirm before Anglo-Jewry and Zionists at large that the Zionist
Organization had made the right choice to favor Weizmann over Brandeis.
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Beyond assisting in fundraising campaigns, Greenberg used the Chronicle as a means to
deliver propaganda for the successful development of Jewish infrastructure in Palestine.
Essentially, he presented the message to his readers that the Zionist dream of an advanced Jewish
civilization in Palestine was becoming a reality. The Chronicle regularly published updates about
Jewish development, with headlines reading “The Jewish National Movement: The Land of
Israel,” or something similar. One such piece came from a correspondent for the paper in 1920,
describing how visitors arriving to the port city of Jaffa “soon behold beneath the deep-blue sky
the leafy avenues and the picturesque rows of trim white stone houses of Tel Aviv, created by the
Jewish hand on the very spot that, but ten years ago, was likewise a bare sandy waste.”66 The
Chronicle’s promotion of Tel Aviv, the shining example of Zionist success, was in step with
official Zionist propaganda of the era.67 A correspondent contributing to the Chronicle in April
of 1923 told the story of Jewish agricultural development in the Jezreel valley in northern
Palestine. He noted, “Thus, we have mastered the Emek in the twentieth century… by the labour
of the Haluzim*, the sacrifice of Jewish workmen, the story of whose heroism will go down as an
epic of the restoration.”68 In telling stories of Jewish labor in Palestine, the Chronicle once again
paralleled the Zionist propaganda tailored to promote the rejuvenating power of working on the
land.69 Greenberg included news and stories from Palestine in nearly every issue of the Jewish
Chronicle until his death in 1931.
Though Greenberg never served in an official capacity for the Zionist Organization
during the 1920s, his newspaper was the largest source for updates on Zionist activity for Anglo-
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Jewry during the period. Indeed, Cesarani noted, “The Jewish Chronicle might have been the
foremost advocate of Zionism in the Jewish world,” not just in Britain.70 In spite of his wellpublicized disagreements with Weizmann, he was a staunch supporter of all activity in Palestine
that served to further Jewish settlement in the region and foster continued Jewish society.
Leonard Stein
Another latecomer to the Zionist movement, Leonard Stein became a valuable assistant to
Weizmann throughout the 1920s, serving as his political secretary and general functionary for
the Zionist Organization. Weizmann explained, “I had heard of him [Stein] as a brilliant Oxford
student… and as a potential Zionist; but the army swallowed him up. I did not get to him until
1918.”71 Stein worked alongside Weizmann in Palestine, often accompanying him on travel.
Stein was a prolific author for the Zionist movement during the 1920s, penning The Truth about
Palestine (1922), co-editing Awakening Palestine with Leon Simon (1923), and authoring “The
Jews in Palestine” (1926). He later produced the seminal work on the development of the Balfour
Declaration, 1961’s The Balfour Declaration. In all his capacities, Stein consistently
demonstrated that he was an important asset to Zionism, chosen from among the ranks of the
British Zionists.
Stein’s dedication to Weizmann and his policies was beyond reproach. Vera Weizmann
recorded, “I shall never forget Leonard Stein’s unparalleled devotion, his wisdom, sincerity, and
serenity.”72 However, while Stein’s travels and work alongside Weizmann were evidently an
important dimension of his contributions, it was in his work as an author for the Zionist cause
that set himself as an individual distinct from Weizmann. In each of the publications to which he
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contributed, Stein worked to weave the narrative of Zionist ascension during the period that
would eventually become enshrined in official histories. A talented author, Stein was particularly
adept at presenting the story of Zionism as a challenge well worth pursuing to an Englishspeaking audience.
In Awakening Palestine, Stein and his co-editor Leon Simon set out to present an allencompassing volume designed to assist the uninformed English-speaking reader of the
motivations behind Zionism and the activities taking place in Palestine to further such
motivations.73 Alfred Mond, Ramsay MacDonald, Weizmann, and other notable Zionists and
British politicians contributed chapters to the work. In covering such diverse issues as education,
agricultural development, investment potential, and industrial growth, Stein and Simon presented
a land of great opportunity and potential. In describing the Jewish effort to rebuild Palestine,
Mond noted, “The process will be long and laborious… but the ultimate result is no longer of
argument or doubt.”74 Professor Patrick Geddes contributed a chapter entitled, “Palestine in
Renewal,” which featured similar rhetoric on the rejuvenating power of agricultural labor as seen
in Zionist propaganda.75 Arthur Ruppin, a longtime Zionist, originally tapped for his forte in
economics under the Wolffsohn presidency, contributed a chapter on economic development in
Palestine. He echoed similar optimism to Mond, noting that developments up to 1924 had been
promising and that “if its development continues at the same rate, there is the prospect of its
becoming in ten or twenty years the most progressive land in the Near East.”76 In providing a
platform for these contributors to pen their thoughts on Zionist activity in Palestine, Stein, along
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with his co-editor Simon, crafted the public understanding about Zionism as progressive,
beneficial, and successful. Like Greenberg, who used the Chronicle to present news of Zionist
success, Awakening Palestine was undoubtedly influential in informing those with little
knowledge of the movement about its work.
Weizmann’s entry in Awakening Palestine covered the Hebrew University at Jerusalem,
with Stein and Simon giving Weizmann a platform to promote one of his most prized successes
and to broaden the public understanding of Zionism. In the late 1890s, Weizmann was part of a
circle of Russian cultural Zionists following Ahad Ha’am. Weizmann explained, “[The potential
Hebrew University] was also part of the general cultural program and spiritual awakening,”
including Jewish cultural renaissance within the broad definition of Zionism.77 Weizmann gave
similar sentiments in his chapter, noting, “There is a Talmudic legend that tells of the Jewish
soul, deprived of its body, hovering between heaven and earth. Such is our soul to-day; tomorrow it shall come to rest in the sanctuary of our University.”78 The cultural side of Zionism is
often overlooked, and Stein and Simon’s decision to include Weizmann’s chapter on the
University is significant for bringing such a perspective to an outside audience.
Stein’s later work, “The Jews in Palestine,” was a greater example of his efforts to craft a
narrative around Zionist history and activity in Palestine. Stein had a keen sense for turning
Zionist history into a compelling story that made the movement’s position by 1926 feel natural
and expected. In doing so, Stein worked to legitimate the Zionist position. “The Jews in
Palestine” was published in Foreign Affairs, likely lending itself to a smaller readership than
Awakening Palestine, but Stein’s work was likely influential once again in shaping public
opinion about Zionism and its history.
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Official Zionist history and the Weizmann mythos in particular tended to describe the
Balfour Declaration as the culmination of linear events—a historical approach Stein hinted at in
“The Jews of Palestine.” Stein wrote, “From the earliest days of the war, the Zionists had
influential friends in the Allied Governments,” which underplayed the challenges and
contingencies that foreshadowed the events of 1917.79 Stein strengthened this myth-building
effort by connecting the Balfour Declaration to the 1882 Aliyah* and the 1897 formation of the
World Zionist Organization.80 Stein’s purpose in this text was never to write a full history, but
his linearization of events appears strikingly influential when compared with later written
histories of the period.
As the title would suggest, Stein was most concerned with providing data and details
about the Jewish population of Palestine, along with optimistic propaganda elements. In
discussing agricultural development for example, Stein once again cited the successes of taming
the Jezreel Valley.81 He touted the successes of education, noting:
[The Jews] have created so extensive a network of Hebrew schools that 85 percent of
Jewish children between five and fourteen years of age are being educated, as compared
with 76 percent in the case of the Christians and 14 percent in the case of the Moslems.82
Indeed, Stein often contrasted the ingenuity and capability of the Jews with the incapability of
the Arabs. The Jewish capacity for developing a land that had languished in poverty for centuries
played a crucial role in Stein’s message of Zionist support in the 1920s and once again reinforced
myths about pre-Zionist Palestine that other historians perpetuated. Stein noted:
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[The Jews] have at their command, not only capital, but precisely those qualities in which
the Arabs are most conspicuously deficient — enterprise, efficiency, and a capacity for
sustained and organized effort.83
Stein justified the Zionist presence in Palestine through presenting Jewish successes juxtaposed
with inferred Arab shortcomings.
Stein ended his Zionist career in the early 1930s amid the declining relationship between
the Zionists and the British Government, serving Weizmann and the movement dutifully for over
a decade. He contributed more to shaping the historical representation of the Zionist movement
and the Weizmann myth than any other British Zionist. While Weizmann valued Stein’s work,
he likely suffered from the same bias that led Weizmann to consider Mond as strictly a
functionary. Vera Weizmann recounted a disagreement between Stein and Chaim Weizmann that
ended with Weizmann insisting he was the one responsible for political decisions.84 Weizmann’s
clear tendency to value policy makers over bureaucratic contributors led to Stein’s omission
when considering important Zionists of the period.
Colonel Frederick Kisch
Like Alfred Mond and Leonard Stein, Frederick Kisch first joined the Zionist movement
in the 1920s, but his role and importance was to go beyond that of anyone else previously
mentioned. Weizmann believed Zionism “needed a man belonging to both worlds, English as
well as Jewish,” on the Palestine Executive, which prior to 1922 was still in its infancy.85
Speaking to General George Macdonogh of Military Intelligence, Weizmann learned of Kisch, a
man who fit the description. Kisch had served primarily with the engineers in Mesopotamia
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during the war, and had no knowledge of Zionism beyond what he had heard of Weizmann in the
press.86
According to Kisch himself, his meeting with Weizmann led to an offer he could not
refuse.87 Kisch learned:
The Zionist Organization had no one available who could negotiate with high British
officials in Palestine on equal terms, while he [Weizmann] also explained the urgent need
of systematic efforts towards reconciliation with the Arabs, a task that greatly appealed to
me.… The offer was based on a unanimous decision of the Executive of the Zionist
Organization.88
Unlike the others in this chapter who received a passing mention for their assistance from
Weizmann in Trial and Error, Kisch received laudatory praise. Weizmann noted, “Kisch showed
himself to be devoted, painstaking and resourceful to a degree, and made a great contribution to
the development of the Jewish National Home in its early formative stages.”89 Kisch too made it
clear that his role was not a small one in the Zionist program, observing, “Thus for more than
eight years, as Director of the Political Department and Chairman of the Executive in Palestine, I
was the official spokesman at Jerusalem of the Zionist movement.”90 Kisch’s role was clearly
invaluable, perhaps more so than the others mentioned in this chapter, and yet his name too is
often lost in the historical assessments of this epoch in Zionist history.
As the Zionist administration in Palestine crystalized, Weizmann was forced to choose
between technically-minded British bureaucrats like Kisch and Mond or long-time career
Zionists, often Russian like himself, but with limited expertise. This dichotomy became apparent
between the differing land acquisition philosophies between Kisch and his counterpart,
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Menachem Ussishkin.* Ussishkin was one of the directors of the Jewish National Fund, a
Britain-based fundraising organization founded in 1901 and while sidelined with the advent of
the KH, still important for land purchasing in Palestine. Ussishkin operated on principles of
idealistic agrarian settlement for Jews in Palestine, while Kisch favored pragmatic, piecemeal
solutions that fostered good relations with the British Administration.91 While not always
operating in opposition, these philosophies jockeyed for dominance in the early 1920s. In a 1922
discussion with John Shuckburg, an official in the newly constituted Middle East Office of
Britain, Weizmann spoke of a “conflict of temperaments between the East European and British
Jews.”92 Taking Kisch and Ussishkin as an example of this conflict, Weizmann chose Kisch,
removing Ussishkin from the Palestine Executive in 1923, with Kisch rising to become its
chairman.93
Beyond purchasing power and priorities, Kisch was very focused on Arab-Jewish
relations during his time serving in Palestine. In the preface to his diary, he explained, “The
Diary will be found to contain abundant evidence… of the persistent efforts made by the Zionist
Executive to reach an understanding with the Arabs,” highlighting both his mission with the
Executive but also his purpose in publishing the diary in 1938.94 Kisch personally negotiated
with Arab leadership on behalf of the Zionist Executive, always seeking to find common ground
and conciliation between the two groups.
In January of 1923, Kisch toured Palestine, visiting Nazareth, Tiberias, and Nablus before
returning to Jerusalem. From Tiberias especially, Kisch concluded, “Here Jews, Moslems and
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Christians live in close contact with each other and not in separate quarters, and apart from one
or two individuals, the Arabs seem to be on terms of real friendship with the Jews.”95 Kisch
further revealed himself to be on good terms with both the Muslim National Club in Jerusalem
and the Executive of the Jerusalem Muslim National Society.96 A Muslim compatriot voiced his
hope that the elections to the Legislative Council for the Arabs would result in a “policy of
entente on the basis that this is necessary for the economic development of the country.”97
Kisch met with King Hussein, one of the most prominent Arab notables who had
previously voiced an interest in cooperation with the Zionist program, in 1924. Kisch and
Hussein found common ground, discussing the proud histories of the two Semitic peoples, and
Kisch dutifully transmitted the Resolution from the 13th Zionist Congress of 1923 regarding
cooperation between the Jews and Arabs in the “regeneration of the Orient.”98 King Hussein
noted in response that “his heart was open to the Jews and his lands also.”99 The meeting allowed
Kisch to clarify the policy behind the Balfour Declaration to another notable, Amir Abdullah,
and he left the engagement feeling once again that he had found moderate Arab notables willing
to work with both the Zionists and the British Administration.
With King Hussein as an example, Kisch was consistently able to speak to moderate
Arab leaders who sympathized with the Zionist mission and were willing to work with both the
British Administration and the Jews to create a sustainably peaceful position in Palestine. The
root of the problem, as Kisch and his allies identified, was the concentration of anti-Zionist
Arabs holding positions within the Government in Palestine.100 Additionally, the Government
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itself did not work sufficiently to foster cooperation between the two peoples. He blamed the
continued poor relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine on years of bad British leadership,
noting, “The Government never ceased to maintain the authority and power of the Arab
extremist group, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini.”101 Kisch concluded
that in the face of the Government’s tacit acceptance of the extreme Arab position, the Zionists’
“friends among the Arabs lost heart and fell away.”102 Despite his tireless efforts to cultivate an
understanding between the two groups, the real power to create cooperation rested outside of
Kisch’s hands; it lay with the British Mandate Government.
Conclusion
As the 1920s ended in disaster, both with the economic crash affecting the world at large
and the Arab riots of 1929, the Zionist position in Palestine dramatically changed. The uneasy
peace in the land between the Jews and Arabs that lasted throughout the decade that had allowed
the Zionists to carry out both immigration and infrastructural development gave way to
impossibly challenging conditions. Mond, Stein, and Kisch did not continue their service in the
face of such challenges.
Nonetheless, the 1920s in isolation could be considered a Zionist success, to which these
British Zionists readily contributed. The Zionist Organization set out to increase the Jewish
population in Palestine through immigration, develop both the industrial and agricultural
capacity, promote their activity to world Jewry and the world at large, and facilitate peace with
the Arabs. For nearly the entire decade, the organization carried out all of these activities, albeit
not necessarily at its preferred pace. Mond, Greenberg, Stein, and Kisch all served in their own
ways to further these goals and help fulfill the initial promise Weizmann presented at the start of
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the decade. The collapse at the start of the 1930s, largely out of the Zionists’ control, should not
be weighed too heavily against the accomplishments of the movement during this pivotal period.
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British Zionists and the Mandate for Palestine: 1920-1931
British parliamentary elections in 1930 reflected the shock and outrage over the economic
crash and Arab riots in Palestine in 1929. Amid a major party realignment in British politics
between the Liberal and Labour Parties, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald faced massive
backlash, a ‘Jewish Hurricane,’ in the face of Britain’s handling of the situation in Palestine.1
The Jewish Chronicle, in recording the elections in Whitechapel, quoted longtime Zionist
supporter Leopold Amery, who said the British Government “showed not goodwill but a
complete lack of sympathy and understanding for the Zionist ideal: not an active desire to help,
but an evident inclination to delay and hinder.”2 The 1930 backlash followed a series of British
actions in Palestine that the Zionists perceived as efforts to renege their commitments to Zionism
expressed in the Balfour Declaration. Over the course of the decade, British Zionists like
Leopold Greenberg, Leonard Stein, and Frederick Kisch worked to use their unique positions as
British Jews to shape British public opinion and influence official policy.
Introduction
The 1920s began positively for the relationship between Great Britain and Zionism and
the Zionist project in Palestine. Governance of Palestine transitioned from a military
administration during wartime occupation to a civil administration, with Herbert Samuel named
as the first High Commissioner. The Jewish Chronicle called the move “in almost every respect
an admirable choice upon which we Jews can congratulate ourselves.”3 In an address to the
Zionist Annual Conference in London, 7 July 1920, Weizmann explained, “Already there has
been set up, under Sir Herbert Samuel, a great Jew and a great administrator, a government in the
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closest sympathy with all our aspirations, and charged to render us every possible assistance.”4
The civil administration of Mandate Palestine began with great optimism on all sides of the
Zionist movement. Beyond figures like Max Nordau and Vladimir Jabotinsky, who either saw
the Balfour Declaration as too amorphous or thought it did not go far enough, most Zionists
believed the Declaration and the administration to herald the long-awaited promise of the Jewish
return to the promised land.5
On the side of the British government, Samuel’s selection and the coming civil
administration in Palestine was positive but emerging conflicts in the region had already given
reason for pause. The Easter Riots of early 1920, an early example of Arab-Zionist tensions,
suggested to the British that the military administration in Palestine should give way to a civil
administration. The principal concern for Samuel and the others at the post-war San Remo
Conference was the compromise between sound state building in Palestine and promoting the
Zionist project. Samuel added, “The P.M. [Lloyd George] agreed that there was a danger. The
practical application of the policy would have to be very careful, but he was convinced that I
would not adopt any rash measures.”6 Policymakers like Lloyd George and George Curzon chose
Samuel as a compromise between Zionist ideals and traditionally liberal colonial statecraft.
Indeed, Samuel’s willingness to compromise his Jewish identity for what he believed to
be strictly British goals was a known factor for British Jewry. While Samuel’s ability to
subordinate his personal attitudes and identity for His Majesty’s government likely endeared him
to policymaking gentile colleagues, the Jewish Chronicle was less kind. That same issue that
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heralded his selection as High Commissioner also noted, “So anxious was Mr. Samuel, when he
was Home Secretary, to show that he did not favour his fellow-Jews that … he went out of his
way where Jews were involved to act rather to their prejudice than in strict justice.”7 Though the
author was probably overly harsh in this regard, Greenberg’s paper’s words were prophetic
regarding the stance on Zionism Samuel would adopt in the coming years during the Mandate.
He was an ally who was nonetheless willing to betray his Zionist goals to placate any and all
opposing forces that threatened the peace in Palestine. Though the Chronicle hoped that “the
new state of affairs now arising in Palestine will give no room for manifesting it [Samuel’s
weakness],” circumstances would arise that would force Samuel to choose between British and
Zionist goals, and his administration, stretching from 1920-1925 would not be the only one to
face such challenges.8
The Arab Revolts, The Churchill Paper of 1922, and the Cabinet Enquiry
Violence broke out in Jaffa in May of 1921, initially between rival Jewish groups and
later between Arabs and Jews, leaving numerous Jews dead. Samuel responded by ordering an
official investigation into the roots of the violence and temporarily suspending Jewish
immigration to Palestine. The Chronicle called this decision “a bad blunder” and noted that
“immigration into Palestine—Jewish immigration—is the very kernel of the Government’s
policy.”9 Greenberg and his supporters articulated their understanding of what the Balfour
Declaration entailed, which in the coming years would become contentious. He and Zangwill
demanded an assertion from the government affirming “the will and policy of Great Britain as
Mandatory of the League Nations, in setting up the Jewish National Home.”10 Samuel’s
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immigration restriction was in direct challenge to this understanding; Greenberg was
uncompromising. The article continues, “But whatever interpretation Mr. Churchill may supply,
we trust he will insist that what is to be built up in Palestine is to be Jewish… A Jewish National
Home… in which the dominant policy is not to be Jewish seems to us a contradiction, both in
terms and of the Balfour Declaration.”11 Greenberg’s disputes with the British government and
Weizmann would crystalize in the coming years over the precise meanings of ‘Jewish National
Home’ and that which was promised in the Balfour Declaration.
For his part, Weizmann echoed many of Greenberg’s attitudes regarding his response to
Samuel’s border closure. In an address he gave in New York on May 15, 1921, Weizmann said,
“We respectfully suggested that the doors of Palestine should be re-opened at once; that on no
account should a concession like that be made to the violence of a few people…We consider it
wrong policy to submit to these forces.”12 Reflecting later when writing his autobiography,
Weizmann noted, “The Arabs soon discovered that the High Commissioner’s deep desire for
peace made him susceptible to intimidation.”13 On this point, Greenberg would have almost
surely agreed. Zionists were unified in their disappointment with Samuel’s handling of the riots
in the spring of 1921; they all awaited the restatement of British policy goals in Palestine that
would emerge the following year under Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill’s and Samuel’s
authorship.
Herbert Samuel took very seriously the second injunction of the Balfour Declaration,
which entailed setting up the Jewish National Home without “prejudice to the civil and religious
rights of the rest of the population.”14 His understanding of the Balfour Declaration and the
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Jewish National Home were markedly different from Greenberg’s, as would soon be made clear.
Samuel recorded that in May of the following year he:
returned to London in order to press upon the Government what I regarded as an
imperative need—that their intentions should be clarified; that the Arabs and the Jews…
should be plainly told what the British policy was. Churchill and the Cabinet agreed: a
statement was drawn up with great care, and presented to Parliament as a White Paper.15
This paper would clarify that the goal of the Balfour Declaration was never to create a wholly
Jewish Palestine or the subjugation of Palestinian Arabs.16 Up to this point, Zionists saw Samuel
as an ally, indeed at times almost an insider, in Zionist circles. However, his role in this new
White Paper of 1922 discredited him to many Zionists and put Weizmann in a difficult place
given his longstanding connections to Samuel and British officials.
Prior to the issuance of the White Paper, Samuel assembled an Arab Delegation to air
grievances with the British Administration so that he could adjust his policy to accommodate
them. He found their attitudes went beyond what he was willing to give, such as insisting upon
the repeal of the Balfour Declaration. The delegation travelled to London in the fall of 1921 to
meet with representatives from the British government and the Zionist Organization with
Churchill presiding. The Chronicle published an account of the message from Mousa Kazim
Pasha El-Husseini and the other members of the delegation detailing their reasons for assisting
the British during the First World War and their dissatisfaction with the Mandate. Ostensibly,
they chose to support the British based on promises of a reconstituted Arab nation; the Balfour
Declaration broke this promise regarding Palestine, and the Arabs wanted to see a fully
representative government rather than the ruling-by-decree style that favored the Zionists.17
Greenberg and his staff believed the delegation’s arrival in England was a sign of their
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willingness to negotiate with less extreme goals in mind, hopeful that discussions would be
fruitful for all sides.
As discussions got underway between the parties in late 1921 and early 1922, Zionists
found that the Arab Delegation was not prepared to acquiesce as they had hoped. In the
Chronicle issue from December 30, 1921, the author notes, “It is… the Arabs who are virulently
bitter against the Jews… the reason is partly because of the insensate selfishness and greed of the
Arabs, partly because they desire, by opposing Zionist policy in Palestine, to get rid of British
influence…”18 Clearly Greenberg had lost all goodwill for the Arabs that the initial suggestion of
the conference had brought. Even before 1922, Leonard Stein had taken the lead for the Zionist
Organization in its defense against the Arab position. The Chronicle reprinted Stein’s letter to
the Times in response to the Arab claims, noting, “Stein has done a good and useful thing in
exposing their pretensions.”19
Replying to a letter from the Arab Delegation that the Times had printed December 19,
Stein assumed the responsibility of presenting the Zionist rebuttal on the behalf of the Zionist
Organization. Stein argued that the Balfour Declaration was not inconsistent with any promises
regarding Arab nationalism from the British government. A 1915 letter to the Sherif of Mecca
made clear Arab independence was conditional upon Arab revolts during the war—Palestine was
completely passive. 20 Stein added, “The only explicit pledge given to the Arabs of Palestine
during the war is, in fact, that contained in the Balfour Declaration itself, which unreservedly
guarantees their civil and religious rights.”21 He concluded his succinct rebuttal with, “It is
surprising that so insulting a demand should be seriously put forward. It would be still more
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surprising if it were seriously entertained.”22 This was the first of Stein’s significant
contributions during the years of Samuel’s tenure as High Commissioner to defend the Zionist
position against Arab grievances. He masterfully demonstrated his rhetorical prowess and close
connections with British leadership in this letter, stressing his intimate knowledge of thenForeign Secretary Grey’s position on the Arab promises and the Balfour Declaration.
By 1922, the discussion had proven itself fruitless, as the two sides could not come to an
understanding. The Arab Delegation put out a statement to Winston Churchill stating:
Whilst the position in Palestine is, as it stands to-day, with the British Government
holding authority by an occupying force, and using that authority to impose upon the
people against their wishes a great immigration of alien Jews… no constitution which
would fall short of giving the People of Palestine full control of their own affairs would
be acceptable.23
This was the ultimate snag in British policy in Palestine—Samuel and Churchill wished to create
self-governing institutions but were keenly aware that doing so would subvert the Zionist
mission. Samuel noted in his memoir:
We repeated attempts to give effect to [fostering self-governing institutions]. They failed,
owing to the obdurate refusal of the Arabs to take part in any constitution which did not
confer full powers upon themselves as the majority. The certain result would have been
that the promise of the Jews, endorsed by all the Allied and Associated Powers, would
have been nullified.24
The British were thus faced with a difficult position that would likely fail to satisfy either the
Zionist or the Arabs. It was in this environment of mutual dissatisfaction that Churchill and
Samuel issued their White Paper, known as the Churchill White Paper of 1922.
The White Paper made clear that tensions among the Jews and Arabs in Palestine were
due mostly to misinformation surrounding the nature of the Balfour Declaration. It read,

22

“The Arab Claim: A Striking Reply,” December 30, 1921, 16.
“Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization,” June, 1922, Cmd. 1700.
24
Samuel, Memoirs, 171.
23

British Zionists and the Mandate for Palestine: 1920-1931

73

“Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become ‘as Jewish as England is English,’”
as exemplary when regarding inflammatory Zionist statements that worried the Arabs.25
Significantly for the Zionists, the White Paper clarified the British position in Palestine vis a vis
the Jews as well as its stance on immigration. It reads:
When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in
Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the
inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish
community… in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole
may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride.26
This was not what many political Zionists believed they had achieved when they gained
international support; it was more in line with earlier goals of cultural Zionists like Ahad Ha’am.
The Paper also restricted Jewish immigration. It stated that immigration “cannot be so
great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country,” and that “it
is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from
Palestine.”27 Stein’s numbers from “The Jews in Palestine” demonstrated Jewish immigration to
hover close to 8,000 per year between 1921 to 1923.28 Given that this number increased nearly
30% in 1924 and more than 300% by 1925 as the British relaxed the restrictions somewhat, the
initial 1922 restrictions were hardly in line with the Zionist goals for Jewish immigration.
Nonetheless, the Jews accepted the White Paper while the Arabs rejected it.
Weizmann and the Zionist leadership recognized the difficult position they were in, along
with the British government regarding the White Paper. At the 1922 Zionist Congress in
Carlsbad, he remarked:
We have every reason to fear that this control might become an instrument of obstruction
and of fierce opposition against our right to immigration. We are aware that difficulties
25
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may arise here, but on the other hand also… these difficulties are of a temporary
measure.”29
He stressed working within the confines of the British system to facilitate economic development
in Palestine, thus meeting Churchill and Samuel’s criteria of economic capacity for further
Jewish immigration. Weizmann added, “I hereby most solemnly declare that as far as I am
concerned I am just as dissatisfied with some parts of the White Paper as you are. But we have
accepted it, and as for myself, I will loyally keep what I have consented to by my signature.”30
He believed the White Paper to be a temporary expedient, and his acceptance was conditional on
this understanding. Although Weizmann spoke to a fractured Zionist Congress, perhaps the most
disjointed since the First World War, in his capacity as President, he set the tone for the
organization’s cooperation with British terms.
While Greenberg and Weizmann had not been amicable prior to the latter’s ascendancy
to the presidency, the Carlsbad statement and the White Paper broadly marked a major shift in
Greenberg’s attitudes toward the leader of the Zionist Organization and the British government.
The Chronicle’s issue from September 1, 1922 was scathing toward both. It labelled the White
Paper as, “a piece of bureaucratic bullying which no constitutional Minister should have dared,
and no self-respecting organization should have tolerated.”31 Greenberg roundly chastised
Weizmann’s acceptance of the Paper, explaining:
That Statement… knocked every ounce of Jewish Nationalism out of the upbuilding of
Palestine and the restoration of the country. It forbade, in advance, Jewish National
development, and crushed in advance very possible aspiration which our people in
Palestine may hereafter nourish for the re-establishment in the land of the Jewish people
as a nation.32
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He didn’t spare Herbert Samuel’s role either, noting:
It is a sorry story, and not the least sorry part of it is that which was played in it by Sir
Herbert Samuel, who vainly… thought by throwing over Zionism and by dealing a
crushing blow to the hopes and aspirations of Jews… to placate the unruly and noisy
elements among the Arabs over who he was set as High Commissioner by the British
government.33
Greenberg did not expect the British to reverse their course and placed in explicit writing a call
for Weizmann and Zionist leadership to roll back their acceptance of the White Paper.
Greenberg and Weizmann were not cut from the same Zionist cloth. Whereas Weizmann
consistently advocated for Jewish economic and social development in Palestine as his brand of
Zionism, Greenberg had been a staunch Jewish nationalist since the early 1900s. Had he lived to
see the formation of Israel as a nation, Greenberg would have almost certainly been a supporter,
given his stance on the Uganda plan. The Chronicle issued on January 19, 1923 gave full
expression to Greenberg’s nationalism vis a vis the White Paper. In discussing the Zionist
project, the Chronicle noted, “But Jews have charged themselves with the great task of Jewish
Nationalism, and they do not mean to leave it until it is finally accomplished, and until Palestine
becomes as Jewish as England is English.”34 It is this phrase which differentiated Greenberg’s
Zionism from Weizmann’s and especially from Herbert Samuel’s. Samuel noted, “Even Dr.
Weizmann himself, in an unhappy moment, had declared that he hoped that Palestine would
become ‘as Jewish as England is English,” but this was never a statement Weizmann made
publicly or made part of the Zionist platform.35 Greenberg’s unwillingness to compromise his
nationalist sentiments made him one of the greatest opposition forces in Britain to both the
mainstream Zionist program and to the Mandate Government.
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1923 marked a transition in government, a shift in British attitudes towards Zionism, and
a fresh inquiry into the situation in Palestine. The pro-Zionist Lloyd George government gave
way to the conservative government of Bonar Law, and anti-Zionist sentiments began to crop up
in the mainstream presses. An inquiry held in the summer of 1923 once again reopened the
question of whether to persist with the policy of the Balfour Declaration. Mainstream press
organizations like the Daily Express and the Daily Mail called on Herbert Samuel to resign,
backing a pro-Arab, anti-Zionist position.36 Greenberg’s Chronicle also rebutted anti-Zionist
assertions from the Times that the League of Nations only conferred the Mandate for Palestine
upon Britain based on the Churchill White Paper.37 This period marked the lowest ebb in the
relationship between the British Government and Zionist policy, and posed an obvious threat
toward the internationally-sanctioned project the Zionist Organization was advancing in
Palestine. It was in this atmosphere that Leonard Stein worked to support the continued British
presence in Palestine on the behalf of Zionism.
In 1923, Leonard Stein worked with Leon Simon to compile the edited volume,
Awakening Palestine. The editors noted in the introduction:
The object of this book is to assist English readers to understand on the one side the
motive force and the significance of Zionist work in Palestine, on the other side the
conditions under which that work is being carried on, the progress which it has made, and
the problems by which it is confronted.38
Stein’s position as a prominent British citizen and political secretary for the Zionist Organization
allowed him to enlist numerous important authors to martial support for the Zionist program. The
book was an explicit counter to the prevalent anti-Zionist rhetoric in Britain during that year that
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suggested the Zionist project was not worth Britain’s time or money. Unlike Greenberg, whose
Chronicle was intended strictly for Jewish readership, Stein and Simon appealed to a wider
gentile public to garner support and sway public opinion.
Perhaps the most significant essays in Awakening Palestine for advocating continued
British support for Zionist efforts in Palestine were Herbert Sidebotham’s “England’s Interest in
Palestine” and Stein’s own “The Problem of Self-Government.” Sidebotham began his essay
with the assertion that:
England has both moral and material interests in Palestine, and they act and react on each
other so constantly that it is not easy to separate them. Different people have taken
different paths to the conclusion that the association between Zionism and British policy
in the East is natural and desirable.39
Sidebotham struck to the heart of Zionist concerns that Britain would renege on their promises if
the British no longer so a geopolitical purpose for their presence in Palestine. Indeed, he devoted
the bulk of his essay towards reinforcing the geopolitical necessity of a British presence. He
concluded by drawing a comparison with the enmity the British had drawn from the Irish.
Sidebotham noted, “If we wish, having removed the enmity of Ireland, to make a new enemy, the
way is clear. We need only repudiate our promises to the Zionists,” adopting the traditional
inflationary stance of international Jewish power while taking a stand in favor of continued
support.40 Sidebotham had been a staunch Zionist supporter for many years, and Stein and
Simon’s choice for him to write on this subject was certainly not an accident.
Stein’s essay on self-government spoke to his earlier repudiations of the Arab Delegation
and the continued concerns Herbert Samuel expressed regarding the League Mandate. Stein
echoed Samuel’s language when he wrote, “They [the Allies] could hardly begin by leaving the
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fate of the Jewish minority to the uncontrolled discretion of an independent Arab Government.”41
He adopted a paternalistic tone regarding the many uneducated Palestinian Arabs, noting that
“independence in the full sense of the term would at the present stage prove to be another name
for grave disorder, if not downright anarchy.”42 Stein’s chapter was instrumental in bridging the
ideological gap between British officials like Samuel and the official Zionist party line. His
statements made it clear that he, and by extension the Zionist Organization were willing to work
within the confines of the British Mandate regarding Zionist developments in Palestine. Though
Greenberg and the Chronicle praised Stein’s earlier writings against the Arab Delegation, Stein’s
stances reflected in his essay and Awakening Palestine more broadly did not fit with Greenberg’s
Jewish Nationalist Zionism. The Chronicle’s “books of the year” noted that Awakening Palestine
was “a valuable collection of essays and studies on the New Judea.”43
Awakening Palestine’s effect on the British reading public was unclear, but the 1923
cabinet enquiries passed without major alterations toward Mandate policy in Palestine since the
White Paper. A review from the Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs said of
Awakening Palestine, “They [the essays] are written for the most part in an atmosphere of
idealism, which has inevitably distorted to some extent the writers’ perspective both as regards
the difficulties of the task and the prospects of its realisation,” suggesting that the arguments
were not cogent for discerning readers.44 In any case, Herbert Samuel was able to defend his
position and actions as High Commissioner to the cabinet, receiving some unlikely assistance
from George Curzon.45 The sequence of events from 1921 to 1923 represented one of the most
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substantial challenges the Zionist Organization would face from the British during the 1920s.
British Zionists like Stein and Greenberg made use of all available resources to marshal support
for the Zionist position and critique leadership when necessary.
Frederick Kisch and Personal Diplomacy with Samuel
Given Frederick Kisch’s position on the Zionist Executive by 1923 and his friendship
with Herbert Samuel, he was uniquely positioned to advocate the Zionist stance directly to the
High Commissioner. Kisch spoke to Samuel’s chief secretary, Whyndam Deedes in 1923 about
Samuel’s political secretary, Ernest Richmond, an Arab expert, whom Deedes and Kisch
concluded was completely opposed to the Mandate policy regarding Zionism.46 Indeed,
Richmond was a staunch Arabist who consistently represented the extreme Arab political
position as a representative sample to Samuel. It was under Richmond’s guidance that Samuel
promoted Hajj Amin, a prominent leader in the Easter riots of 1920, to the position of Grand
Mufti.47 Kisch was thus charged with counteracting Richmond’s influence over the High
Commissioner, reminding the Mandate Government of its commitment to Zionism.
Samuel’s consistent willingness to tolerate insubordination from Arab notables under
Mandate rule was troubling for Kisch, as his tolerance served to encourage further activity from
the extremist faction. This was most evident during the boycotts of the popular elections to the
Legislative Council, during which extremist Arabs were able to use their influence to force a
wider population to flout Mandate policy without fear of punishment.48 Kisch found another man
in the administration willing to aid the Zionist cause when he met Deedes’ successor, Gilbert
Clayton, who served as Civil Secretary from 1922 to 1925. Clayton and Kisch agreed that
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Samuel’s dedication to traditional British Liberalism was out of step with the political situation
in Palestine, as the two saw clearly that the Mandate Government needed to take greater action to
shape a moderate Arab constituency to counteract the extremist faction.49 Instead, the
administration continued to allow known anti-Zionists to staff the Arab positions.
Samuel’s liberalism manifested in his dedicated policy of non-assistance to developing
Jewish infrastructure in Palestine. Kisch observed:
A constructive-minded and far-seeing Government would have planned their economic
policy so as to encourage industrial development and take advantage of the
unprecedented interest which Jews throughout the world are taking in Palestine. Nothing
of the kind has been attempted here under Herbert Samuel’s regime.50
Kisch was not the only one to note this, as Stein voiced in “The Jews in Palestine,” “So far as
active cooperation is concerned, [the Mandatory Power has played] a very small part.”51 Samuel
himself chose this policy so as not to appear that he favored the Jews over the Arabs, but the
policy evoked the same logic as the Chronicle’s observations about Samuel’s tenure as Home
Secretary.
Despite the obstacles to cooperation between Samuel and Kisch, representing the
Zionists, Kisch’s assessment towards the end of Samuel’s time in office were mostly positive.
Throughout their time together in Palestine, Kisch had exceptional access to the High
Commissioner, speaking to him at least once a week when the two were both at their offices in
Jerusalem. Kisch and Samuel understood one another well, even though they often disagreed
over policy. In the last days of his administration, Samuel visited the Zionist Executive to give
his advice and receive a farewell. Kisch, who attended the meeting, noted:
The more I think about it, the more I feel that the Executives are entitled to be satisfied
with the results of the past two years’ work: as regards Arab relations, immigration, and
49
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even the financial position, the achievements compare favorably with those of previous
inter-Congress periods.52
Despite their disagreements, Samuel had provided the Zionists with an acceptable, if not ideal,
position in which to operate from 1923 to 1925, leading Kisch to conclude, “I realize that it may
be a very long time before Palestine has an administrative chief of Herbert Samuel’s intellectual
capacity.”53
The Passfield White Paper and Weizmann’s Resignation
From 1923 until he stepped down as High Commissioner two years later, Herbert Samuel
achieved what he desired most: peace in Palestine and cooperation at home in Britain. He noted,
“The second half was a time of steady progress and comparative calm… There had been no
disturbances for a long time.”54 Weizmann and the Zionist Organization continued their program
under the restrictions of the White Paper without significant complaint, while Greenberg and
those who pushed for a hardline stance continued to stew. Unfortunately, Greenberg’s
assessment that the British position regarding Zionism would not improve, that Weizmann was
mistaken in his understanding of the White Paper as temporary, would prove correct toward the
close of the decade.
On July 1, 1925, Samuel concluded his tenure as high commissioner of Palestine, leaving
behind a legacy of economic development and political ossification between the two constituent
ethnic groups. Assessments of his time in office were mixed—the controversy of the
immigration ban and White Paper had significantly eroded his goodwill with Zionists. Stein,
writing on the behalf of the Zionist Organization, transmitted:
The Congress bids a heartfelt farewell to Sir Herbert Samuel, whose five years’ term of
Office as the first High Commissioner for Palestine has brought Palestine the blessings of
52
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peace, order and good government, and has witnessed the completion of the first stage in
the establishment of the Jewish National Home.55
Weizmann was more reserved in his personal letter while remaining congratulatory, noting, “I
have tried my best—sometimes under very difficult circumstances—to adapt myself to your
views and actions, and even if at times there were differences of opinion.”56 While Greenberg
and the Chronicle printed a charitable summary of Stein’s message on July 10, an earlier issue
illustrated Greenberg’s dissatisfaction with the administration. In the June 26, 1925 issue, the
article noted, “Sir Herbert appears anxious to explain how it is that the promise of the Balfour
Declaration has petered out so woefully into the performance of the Palestine Administration,”
critiquing Samuel’s unwillingness to lean into Zionism fully.57 Greenberg had not forgiven
Samuel for his role in the detested White Paper nor Weizmann’s role in its acceptance. In any
case, Sir Herbert Plumer’s assumption as the next High Commissioner of Palestine was not
heralded with any special fanfare.
In many respects, Herbert Samuel set the tone that would persist through the decade for
how the Mandate Government would treat its responsibilities towards the Arabs and the Jews. In
the history of Britain’s time in control of Palestine, no other High Commissioner served for
anywhere close to Samuel’s five years, as Sir John Chancellor would replace Plumer officially in
1928. Samuel was correct that his administration had brought peace to the region, but that peace
came at a price. Wasserstein suggested that:
As time went on the Government of Palestine itself became little more than an umpire
between these two parallel governments… The arrangements preserved a makeshift
peace in Palestine for a while, but its long-term effect was to increase the estrangement
between the Arab and Jewish communities.58
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Samuel’s peace required placing the British government at odds with the Arabs, who never
accepted the White Paper, and the Jews, who viewed the policy as a violation of the promises in
the Balfour Declaration. He never addressed the underlying causes of the violence between the
two groups during the Arab revolts at the start of his administration. Despite Stein’s assertion
that the Arab Delegation of the early 1920s was “far from commanding the unqualified
confidence of the public,” those elements within Arab society in Palestine vehemently opposed
toward Zionist activity had not been eradicated during Samuel’s tenure.59
The Arab Revolts of 1929 represented the worst violence in the region during the
Mandate period. Weizmann recalled receiving a message while on holiday in the summer of
1929, which brought him “the first news of the Palestine pogroms of 1929, in which nearly a
hundred and fifty Jews were killed, hundred more wounded, and great property damage
done.”60At a protest rally in London in early September, at which Moses Gaster also spoke,
Weizmann said:
The Jewish people, relying on the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate accepted by
Great Britain, has proceeded with an ever-increasing energy during the past ten years in
its great task of the peaceful upbuilding of Palestine. Much of what we have achieved has
now suffered violent and wanton destruction… As citizens of the Mandatory Power, we
feel with special intensity the blow that has been struck at Jewish life in Palestine which
has been created on a basis of confidence with the British Mandate.61
This event in many ways echoed the themes of the earlier major Arab Revolt: violence affected
the Jewish population of Palestine; the British response proved unsatisfactory to the Zionists.
This instance was more severe, as the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, was hardly as
amenable to the Zionist stance as Churchill had been during Samuel’s administration.
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Weizmann recorded that Passfield had never been a Zionist supporter prior to the revolts,
and upon meeting with him after the incident, realized that “they [the Colonial Office] would use
this opportunity to curtail Jewish immigration to Palestine.”62 He was similarly critical of the
administration in Palestine, which issued a report on the events which Weizmann noted was
“made to appear that there were two peoples at war in Palestine, with the British administration
as the neutral guardian of law and order.”63 In a discussion with General Smuts, a longtime
supporter of Zionism within the British government, the general informed Weizmann that
Passfield had said, “It is obvious that the British officials in Palestine disliked the Jews;” the
general also felt that Chancellor was the wrong man to serve as High Commissioner.64 By this
point, Kisch was a smaller Zionist voice to the British Administration. Weizmann noted, “As his
[Kisch’s] authority grew with the Yishuv, it diminished at Government House, and, more
especially, among the lower strata of British officialdom in Palestine.”65 This was made apparent
when Passfield listed Jewish advocates in Palestine, naming Weizmann and Mond but not
Kisch.66 Ultimately, by 1929, Weizmann and the Zionist Organization were on far worse terms
with the British Colonial Secretary and High Commissioner than they had been seven years
prior.
Bad relations between British officials and Weizmann were especially concerning for the
latter, as his leadership during the decade rested on the understanding that he was the most
qualified to serve as the intermediary between the two groups. As Halpern noted, “Weizmann’s
vision of himself as popular leader was no longer merely the subjective ambition of earlier years;
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it amounted to an obligation to the British government, a tacit condition of an understanding with
them on which the upbuilding of the Jewish national home depended.”67 This obligation was a
double-edged sword: Weizmann had ingratiated himself to British officials in the early 1920s,
but his ties to the British government could only serve him as the leader of the Zionist
Organization so long as the British government remained friendly to the Zionist enterprise. Even
before 1929, this had proven to be a challenge, as demonstrated in Greenberg’s rebuke of
Weizmann for caving to the terms of the Churchill Paper. Weizmann was fortunate in 1922 that
the revolts and the British response had, when viewed in retrospect, been somewhat mild. The
events of 1929 and 1930 would prove more damaging to his relationships with both parties.
Unlike the wake of the earlier Arab Riots, the Chronicle dedicated a full page spread to
the “Grave Disaster in Palestine / Arabs Massacre Jews / Martial Law / Administration
Disregards Warning.”68 Greenberg brought more attention to the administration’s failings in this
instance than he had in the early 1920s. So too did he set the tone for his paper’s coverage of the
fallout for the incident. In the June 27 issue in 1930, the Chronicle noted, “During the past year a
series of happenings have occurred in and about Palestine which… have tended to shatter even
the confidence Jews felt in the intention of the government in respect to the Jewish National
future.”69 Greenberg also printed contributions from members of Anglo-Jewry who agreed with
him that Britain appeared to be looking for a way out of their commitments. This same issue
further reinforced the gulf of understanding between Greenberg’s understanding of Zionist aims,
those of the government’s and Weizmann, when the paper added, “A National Jewish Home
must be, in some form or another, a Jewish State.”70 The dissatisfaction Greenberg felt towards
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the British government in Palestine in 1929 assuredly dwarfed that which he felt in 1922. The
Chronicle reinforced the narrative that the violence in 1929 was preventable had the
administration taken the appropriate action.71
Just as in 1921, various investigations determined that the best course of action for the
British government to take following the violence was the issuance of a statement to clarify
policy in Palestine. This would become known as the Passfield White Paper, a significantly more
anti-Zionist document than the Churchill Paper before it. Issued in the fall of 1930, this paper
would ignite a firestorm of controversy that would irrevocably damage the Zionist relationship
with Britain and Weizmann’s relationship with the organization. Weizmann spoke out against
the statement in an article he penned in the Week-end Review, observing that, “The government’s
declaration of policy in regards to Palestine has been condemned in the most authoritative
quarters as irreconcilable with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.”72 The White Paper
restricted the legal jurisdiction of what was considered Palestine within British administrative
organizations and further restricted immigration. The Paper stated:
Any hasty decision in regard to unrestricted Jewish immigration is to be strongly
deprecated…. So long as wide-spread suspicion exists, and it does exist, amongst the
Arab population, that the economic depression under which they undoubtedly suffer at
present is largely due to excessive Jewish immigration, and so long as some grounds exist
upon which this suspicion may be plausibly represented to be well-founded, there can be
little hope of any improvement in the mutual relations of the two races.73
Rather than the economic qualifications for further Jewish immigration under which the 1922
White Paper rested, Weizmann correctly observed that Jewish immigration could now be
restricted on the ground of any Arab suspicion of Jewish injuriousness. Perhaps the most
egregious aspect of the Passfield White Paper for the Zionists was that it blamed Jewish
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immigration for economic depression and rising unemployment in Palestine, while spreading
blame across both Jews and Arabs for the violence in 1929, despite the Zionists’ assertion it was
mainly an Arab-driven event.
Nonetheless, Weizmann and the Zionist Organization entered into discussions with the
British government and the Arabs over policy in Palestine. Though Weizmann was initially
hesitant, he submitted just as he had in the early 1920s, believing continued positive relations
with Great Britain to be important to the future of Zionist development. The Chronicle observed:
We hope sincerely that the negotiations between the Government and the Agency are
upon some basis other than the one which Dr. Weizmann rightly declared he would not
agree to…It is hardly conceivable that the Agency, with Dr. Weizmann either leading or
following, could have been led into so obvious a tactical blunder.74
Though he entered into discussions, Weizmann recorded later that following the issuance of the
White Paper, “There was nothing left for me but to resign my position as President of the Jewish
Agency.”75
Despite Weizmann’s disavowal of the White Paper, some Zionist groups blamed his
leadership for the circumstances. An article from the New York Times records that the Zionist
Revisionists of America stated that the White Paper was a result of the “improper policy and
cowardly attitude of Dr. Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist Executive.”76 The December 5 issue
of the Jewish Chronicle from 1930 noted:
For he [Weizmann] either must have known and realized what was proceeding and has
eventuated in the White Paper, or he can have had no conception of what was about to
happen. In the latter case his incompetence in the position he has occupied is placed
beyond question. In the former, then having regard to the policy he has pursued, and for
which he has been in the main responsible, his services to the Movement alone can be
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pleaded in extension of the unmitigated and uncompromising condemnation he has
earned.77
The discussions took much longer than anticipated, lasting until February of 1931. Weizmann
lost the respect of those like Greenberg who came to believe that the discussions were tacitly
conceding ground to the White Paper.
On February 13, the Zionists received a re-statement of policy in the form of an open
letter from Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to Weizmann, essentially retracting the essence
of the White Paper in the form of a reinterpretation of the Paper’s meaning. Weizmann recorded,
“I considered that the letter rectified the situation,” but many, including Greenberg, disagreed.78
Greenberg’s Chronicle, published on the same day as the letter, observed, “You cannot
‘interpret’ away a great wrong or explain satisfactorily a palpable betrayal.”79 Just as he had with
the 1922 White Paper, Greenberg once again chastised Weizmann for accepting meager
concessions from the British government, but in stronger words this time. The Chronicle noted,
“[Weizmann had compromised] on every occasion when he found himself charged to guard the
threatened interests of our people in Palestine. But such putty-like amenity will not this time be
endorsed or forgiven by Zionists worthy of the name.”80 Greenberg’s interest in Weizmann’s
resignation began early.
The Zionist Congress of 1931 would mark the end of Weizmann’s tenure as President of
the Zionist Organization. He commented later, “As the Congress of 1931 approached I became
the butt of ever-mounting attacks, and the occasion for a pernicious extremist propaganda.”81
Greenberg’s Chronicle reinforced assessments of Weizmann’s leadership that resounded among
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Revisionist circles such as those mentioned above in the New York Times. More significantly for
Weizmann’s future was that Greenberg’s message echoed that of Vladimir Jabotinksy, an
influential attendee of the Zionist Congress and leader of the Revisionist Movement. In the
Chronicle issue from May 29, 1931, the paper observed, “The continuance in office of Dr.
Weizmann without some drastic change in and the withdrawals of certain pronouncements he
has recently made, must be fatal to Zionism for years to come.”82 By the end of the Congress,
Weizmann had resigned, with Jabotinsky and the Revisionists driving for the vote of
nonconfidence. Weizmann’s position had become too Anglophilic; he could no longer count on
the support of a fellow Russian Zionist like Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky and the Revisionists were
ideologically more in line with Greenberg’s brand of Jewish nationalism, and expressed his
uncompromising attitude on the Congressional stage.
Weizmann summed up his leadership tenure in an address to the Congress on 1 July,
1931, touching on the political and economic developments of the Zionist movement over the
course of the decade. He specifically thanked Leonard Stein, among others for the “great
services” they rendered during the period.83 Weizmann was unable to stand up to the tide of
reactionism within the Zionist Organization following his handling of the Passfield Paper. At the
Congress, the Political Committee “framed a resolution calling for the definition of the aim of
Zionism as a ‘Jewish majority within the historical boundaries of Palestine.’”84 While Greenberg
had no direct impact on the outcome of congressional elections, he certainly furthered the
discourse of Jewish nationalism that would prove more prevalent in the coming decades than
Weizmann’s traditionally conservative approach.
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Conclusion
By the end of 1931, Ramsay MacDonald’s Government had fallen, Weizmann was out of
office, and Greenberg had passed away. The year marked the end of an era for the Zionist
movement and Britain’s Mandate for Palestine. During this period, Leonard Stein proved that he
was more than just Weizmann’s secretary—he played integral roles for the Zionist Organization
during some of its most trying times with the British government. Frederick Kisch was integral
to Zionist work with the British on the ground in Palestine. Greenberg refuted the assertion in the
Manchester Guardian printed in his obituary: Mr. Greenberg retired from Zionist work upon
becoming editor of the Jewish Chronicle.85 While Greenberg may have renounced party politics,
his role in Zionism remained prominent, as he turned his pen towards advancing his own brand
of Zionism even as it differed from the party line.
British Zionists like Greenberg, Kisch, and Stein proved to be uniquely positioned with
regards to the Zionist Organization and Great Britain during the prominent instances when
influence was most needed. Leonard Stein was able to marshal his resources to counter the Arab
Delegation in the early 1920s and produce valuable propaganda pieces for the movement tailored
to an increasingly skeptical British audience. Greenberg used his newspaper to alter the discourse
surrounding Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist Organization’s trajectory over the course of the
decade, eventually finding elements of his ideology present within the highest levels of
leadership. The decade proved that British Zionists could not be condensed within the broader
Zionist umbrella, but should indeed be considered as important actors within their own right.
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Conclusion

The question when considering the historiography of Zionism is how did Weizmann
change from a dominant figure with a personality cult at the time of his death in 1952 to a
“political dodo” by the 1980s?1 This question is significant to the present study because
Weizmann is inextricably linked to the history of Zionism from 1914 to 1931, and his
historiographic fate has inextricably shaped historical perception of the era and his
contemporaries. In short, Weizmann must be considered important for historians to begin to
consider other figures within Zionism during the period such as Gaster, Greenberg, Stein, Kisch,
or Mond.
The answer to the historiographical question lies in part with the rapidly evolving
historical trajectory of the state of Israel. Historians working on Theodor Herzl (“Herzl studies”)
have recontextualized the movement’s founder’s work within the paradigm of a Jewish state.
Dimitry Shumky’s Beyond the Nation State told of one such historian, Alex Bein, noting:
Thus, the establishment of a nation-state, an undoubtedly fundamental historical turn in
the political Jewish existence and one that Bein witnessed himself, had a profound
influence on his representation of the past.2
Shumsky’s text included five chapters, each dedicated to a paradigmatic Zionist, and Weizmann
is noticeably absent. Weizmann cannot be adopted like Herzl for the context of a Jewish state. To
take Norman Rose’ phrase:
Amidst the excitement and drama of Israel having to defend her independence by force of
arms, the figure of Chaim Weizmann emerges, if at all, as a quixotic, elderly gentleman
whose political ideas and style have become outdated, unfashionable, for some even
positively harmful, and whose career has been consigned to a calm backwater rarely
disturbed by an inquisitive public.3
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Weizmann’s legacy was swept away in the oncoming decades as Zionist priorities and
geopolitical realities changed; circumstances after the Second World War forever changed the
Jewish relationship to Zionism.
And yet for all this, Rose countered, “Under his stewardship the history of the Zionist
movement reads, despite its disappointments and setbacks, as one of the most remarkable
political success stories of the twentieth century.”4 Rose and Jehuda Reinharz rescued Weizmann
from the “calm backwater” and once again brought him into the realm of historical study in the
1980s, reinvigorating the Weizmann myth as they did so. Later historians like Renton and
Berkowitz have built upon their work, even if they sought to dismantle the Weizmann myth with
their contributions.
The historiographical trajectory points to greater focus on the figures given less attention
in the Weizmann myth narrative, but nonetheless preserving his epoch as one fit for historical
study. It is in this context in which the present study lies. Gaster, Greenberg, Stein, Mond, and
Kisch are only a few of the British Zionists whose names and contributions have often been
overlooked, to say nothing of the many who lacked a platform to make their contributions
known. The scope of this study is too small to cover this topic in its entirety but it should
nonetheless serve as a starting point for future research in the subject area.
At the heart of the matter is the conviction that this era is worthy of study. While the
geopolitical realities of the prewar and interwar periods bear little resemblance to the modern or
even postwar periods, they are nonetheless highly instructive in potential and contingency. The
eventuality of the Second World War obscures the significance of the sheer amazement any of
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the 4,670 new Jewish immigrants must have felt as they stepped off the boats in 1920 to start a
new life in the Promised Land in the wake of the First World War.5 The partial fulfillment of the
old promise of the Basel Program in the 1920s invites historians to consider Zionism’s course in
Palestine before the idea of a nation-state became inseparable from the movement. While the
discourse on contingency surrounding British activity in the Middle East during this period has
been vibrant since as least as early as Elizabeth Monroe’s 1963 Britain’s Moment in the Middle
East, the Zionist epoch has only recently become a revisited subject of historical interest.
In accepting this period of Zionist history as an important era for study, historians must
affirm Weizmann’s significance to the movement and to the course of history in Palestine. Doing
so in turn necessitates a more thorough examination of the figures who assisted Weizmann, who
formed his cultural milieu. Britain in general and British Zionists particularly have been
underserved in this regard, especially when considering the unique roles the nation and its people
played during this epoch. Weizmann’s story is evidently important to Zionist history but it
cannot be allowed to completely marginalize those of others who operated contemporaneously
with the leader.
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